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Since 2002, there have been varying definitions of homeland security. Disagreements 
about what homeland security is can cause misalignment with budgets and homeland 
security priorities. The objective of this thesis is to better understand homeland security 
through the lens of risk and uncertainty using a metaphorical approach comparing 
homeland security and financial markets. The usefulness of the financial market 
metaphor is it allows one to conceptualize homeland security as an investor’s financial 
portfolio that is subject to market volatility, market sentiment and mood, investing costs, 
and market booms and busts.  
This metaphorical approach for understanding homeland security suggests a 
nontraditional risk-based antifragile strategy. More than being robust or resilient, which 
resist or absorb volatility, an antifragile strategy benefits from volatility, adapts, and 
becomes better. To make something antifragile, individuals and organizations should 
invest more time in identifying things or processes that are negative rather than focus on 
the positive. Removing things that are negative can uncover hidden options that can 
better prepare people or organizations for uncertainty and market volatility. This is a 
strategy that relies less on definitions of homeland security and is a bottom up, rather than 
a top down, approach to risk management. 
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Homeland security has many evolving definitions, depending on when and whom you 
ask. Since 2002, there have been numerous strategic documents framing national and 
homeland security policy; many have varying definitions of homeland security. 
Disagreements about what homeland security is can cause misalignment with budgets 
and homeland security strategies.1 While the meaning of homeland security continues to 
evolve, one way to understand homeland security is through the lens of risk and 
uncertainty.  
The objective of this thesis is to observe how investors think and react to risk and 
uncertainty that is dynamic in order to seek an appropriate strategy for the homeland 
security domain. This thesis uses a lens of risk and uncertainty through a metaphorical 
approach that compares homeland security and financial markets. It uses the metaphor, 
homeland security as a stock market, to apply knowledge from financial markets to better 
understand analogous and sometimes irrational behavior of homeland security, especially 
as it relates to risk and uncertainty (see Figure 1).  
The usefulness of the financial market metaphor is it allows one to conceptualize 
homeland security as an investor’s financial portfolio that is subject to market volatility, 
market sentiment and mood, investing costs, and market bubbles and busts. What this 
teaches is financial and homeland security domains share the common denominator of 
individual and market behavior that is profoundly affected by psychological biases, 
especially when confronted by complex risk and uncertainty. This suggests exploring a 
nontraditional risk-based strategy of antifragility. More than being robust or resilient, 
which resist or absorb volatility and return to their normal states, strategies that are 
antifragile benefit from volatility, have more upside than downside, adapt and become 
better than they were.2  
1  Shawn Reese, Defining Homeland Security: Analysis and Congressional Considerations, CRS 
Report 42462 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Research Service, Jan 8, 2013).  
2 Nassim Taleb, Antifragile: Things that Gain from Disorder (New York: Random House, 2012), 301–
335. 
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Figure 1. Thesis word cloud: Visually interpreting the major themes of this thesis 
and how they fit into the picture of homeland security.3  
 
Studying the financial domain requires understanding how investors allocate 
limited assets over time under conditions of certainty and uncertainty. Similarly, studying 
the homeland security domain requires considering how Americans allocate limited 
resources on a rational or seemingly irrational prioritized risk basis to prevent or mitigate 
terrorist attacks within the United States. This requires reducing the vulnerability of the 
strategic components of American power, which includes the economy and its financial 
domain.4 Financial markets have huge implications for the solvency of the nation and the 
general condition of the economy. Protecting the security and confidence of others in the 
nation’s economy and financial systems is one of the key objectives of the homeland 
security domain.5  
3 Picture from Watch Dog Wire, http://watchdogwire.wpengine.netdna-
cdn.com/florida/files/2013/05/dhs-patch-630x286.jpg. (Word cloud created at created at Tagxedo.com.) 
4 James  Kurth cites economic power as the essential base for military and ideological power. See 
“Pillars of the American Century,” http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=688; ADM 
Michael Mullen has in multiple venues cited the national debt as the most significant threat to national 
security. See http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/08/27/debt.security.mullen/. 
5 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano’s 2nd 
Annual Address on the State of America’s Homeland Security: Homeland Security and Economic 




                                                 
To understand homeland security as a stock market, it is first important to 
understand how stock markets behave. In many instances, stock markets behave 
efficiently. In an efficient market, stock prices revolve around the continuous flow and 
interpretation of information where stock prices fully reflect all available information. 
Transactions in the market, seen as buying and selling, serve as a means of price 
discovery, where investors learn the value of whatever is being traded.6 As new 
information becomes available, the market quickly digests and adjusts prices accordingly.  
Similarly, an efficient homeland security market implies that transactions between 
adversaries also serve as a means of price discovery. Advantages and exploitations from 
either an adversary perspective (i.e., threats), or from a government perspective (i.e., 
countermeasures) are short lived, as each entity acts on the available information in the 
environment. New threat intelligence is analyzed to determine the potential threats, 
vulnerabilities, and consequences. Countermeasures are employed to areas of greatest 
risk, while the political process engages regulations and international regimes to mitigate 
risk. As information is discovered in the homeland security market, the price or value of 
the exchange between threats and countermeasures increases or decreases (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Homeland security as a stock market visual. 
6  Robert Shiller, Finance and the Good Society (New York: Princeton University Press, 2012), 555, 
Kindle edition. 
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 Alternatively, research from psychology and behavioral economics have shed new 
light on the nonefficient nature of financial markets. Biases, irrational behaviors, and 
feedback of the market participants themselves affect and are affected by valuation and 
the perception of risks. This helps to explain why many investors buy high and sell low, 
and why markets undergo bubbles and busts. Market complexity gives an idea of the 
inherent nature of things to move from a state of stability to instability, or from an 
efficient market to an inefficient one. This is the study of individual yet interconnected 
parts of a system that tend to move from a state of equilibrium to upheaval, as seen 
through bubbles, busts, and Black Swans.7 
In a similar fashion, bubbles and inefficient markets can also be seen from a 
homeland security system perspective. Nowhere is this more apparent than with 
terrorism. Inadequate and inappropriate countermeasures can occur for numerous 
reasons, including but not limited to complacency, fiscal reductions, and not 
understanding and/or underestimating the dynamic and agile nature of threats. Similar to 
an investment portfolio that is not diversified, not having the necessary countermeasures 
in place increases risk in the homeland security system and can lead to a vacuum bubble 
of under-protection.   
Yet perhaps even more common in a post-9/11 environment, though sometimes 
inconspicuous, is a bubble of over-protection. This can entail massive use of costly 
resources and restrictive regulations that can limit individual freedoms in exchange for a 
promise of safety. Likewise, public outrage from terrorism and its political dimensions 
can demand homeland security leadership to react and employ numerous and often costly 
antiterrorism activities, even if these actions cannot be proven effective.  
This thesis cautions that in the current market, homeland security can easily fall 
victim to or may already be operating in a bubble of over-protection without sufficient 
regard to the cost-benefits. In financial markets, investment expenses and opportunity 
7  Mark Buchanan, Ubiquity: Why Catastrophes Happen (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2001), 273; 
Ted Lewis, Bak’s Sand Pile (Williams California: Agile Press, 2011), 46; Melanie Mitchell, Complexity A 
Guided Tour (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 335, Kindle edition.  
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costs from an overly conservative portfolio can have debilitating affects on returns. Akin 
to an overly conservative portfolio, homeland security may be operating in a bubble of 
over-protection, where the costs, both monetary and personal liberties, can be 
incommensurate with the expected end-states of safety and security. 
Biases also play a major role in interfering with peoples’ ability to interpret and 
understand our actual exposure and susceptibility to market volatility and Black Swan 
events.8 The events of 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, Super Storm Sandy, the Boston 
bombings, the near misses of Northwest Flight 253, and the bombing attempt on Times 
Square all represent varying levels of volatility. Events such as these can shock the 
homeland security market.  
These events show that even with sound investing strategies, a homeland security 
portfolio is subject to the volatilities and uncertainty of the market. However, often time 
the potential for greatest opportunities emerge during times when fear and risk seem to 
dominate the conscience, as seen during the nadir of the recent financial crisis in 2009. 
What is important is how homeland security investors plan to respond to these events and 
seek long-term opportunity in the midst of crisis. 
Adopting a broad framed, antifragile approach is key to dealing with and taking 
advantage of Black Swans, volatility, and uncertainty. Antifragility is a strategy for 
strategies. More than being robust or resilient, which resist or absorb volatility and return 
to their normal states, strategies that are antifragile benefit from volatility, have more 
upside than downside, adapt and become better than they were.9 An antifragile strategy 
incorporates via negativa, optionality, and leveraging knowledge of biases.10 
To make something antifragile, individuals and organizations should invest more 
time in identifying those things and processes that do not work correctly rather than focus 
on improving or protecting what works. This is known as via negativa, or the negative 
way. What is known to be wrong is more robust to error than what we know is good. 
8  D. Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), 278–288. 
9 Nassim Taleb, Antifragile. 
10 Ibid. 
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Removing things that are negative can uncover hidden options that can better prepare 
people for uncertainty and market volatility. Options are a means that allow investors to 
asymmetrically deal with uncertainty by limiting downside losses and capitalizing on 
gains. Options also enable antifragility through seeking opportunity in volatility that is 
inherent in both the homeland and financial markets.11  
Examples of via negativa in homeland security might include DHS Congressional 
oversight reform and adjusting or eliminating activities whose costs are disproportionate 
to the expected gains. This includes combining or eliminating redundant agency 
activities, i.e., maritime security activities of Coast Guard and Customs and Border 
Protection’s Office of Air and Marine. To address costs, DHS should mandate more cost-
share policies that allocate security costs to those users who benefit the most, i.e, the 9/11 
aviation security fee and reducing FEMA disaster assistance. 
As evidence points to costs being disproportionate with the risks, this suggests 
that Congress and the Administration should seek to ways to gain broader consensus to 
reduce the cost of investing with DHS or seek a new investment manager all together. 
This via negativa approach may require outside innovation and realignment, bearing 
tough questions, such as: What does DHS look like without terrorism? Without 
terrorism—what justifies the Department and its costs to the freedoms of the very citizens 
it has been formed to protect? What costs are we willing to bear for a small reduction in 
risk that is already low? These and similar questions should seek to expose and ultimately 
remove elements of DHS which tend to fragilize things and create a need for ever more 
complexity to function.  
Antifragility for homeland security is a nontraditional way of risk management 
that relies less on definitions by managing the security environment bottom up rather than 
top down—removing the small negative risks to reduce the overall systemic risk. 
Antifragility is not a stock picking methodology. It will not suggest what stocks to buy 
tomorrow or what homeland security countermeasures need to be employed. Rather, it is 
a strategy for strategies; it creates options to better prepare for and take advantage of 
11 Ibid. 
 xviii 
                                                 
future market volatility. To protect against a bubble or an irrational market, all levels of 
government should regularly question the market and experts by making bets against 
market sentiment and routinely revisit the level and understanding of risk and challenge 
assumptions. Homeland security practitioners should ask in their particular sphere of 
work or influence, “What does not work well? What negatively impacts my work in 
homeland security? How can I have an impact to change these things?” The answers to 
these questions will likely produce a homeland security strategy that is more impactful, 
less reliant on definitions, and more robust to error than many activities and strategies 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Homeland security has many evolving definitions, depending on when and whom 
you ask. Since 2002, there have been numerous strategic documents framing national and 
homeland security policy; many have varying definitions of homeland security. 
Disagreements about what homeland security is can cause misalignment with budgets 
and homeland security priorities and strategies.12 In Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking 
Glass, Humpty Dumpty could easily have been thinking of homeland security as he 
educated Alice on the meaning of words:  
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful voice, “it 
means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less!”  
 
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so 
many different things.”  
 
“Not so,” said Humpty-Dumpty, “the question is which is to be the master. 
That’s all.”13 
 
Figure 1.  Alice meets Humpty Dumpty. Illustration by Tenniel from 
Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass). 
12  Shawn Reese, Defining Homeland Security: Analysis and Congressional Considerations, CRS 
Report 42462 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Research Service, Jan 8, 2013).  
13  Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass (Amazon Digital Services, Sep 2011), 980. Kindle 
edition. 
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However, definitions do not always have to be applicable to all situations or have 
the same meaning to different individuals. In Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland, the Duchess 
instructed Alice to “Take care of the sense and the sounds will take care of 
themselves.”14 While the definition of homeland security has been a moving target and 
continues to evolve, one way to understand homeland security is through the lens of risk 
and uncertainty. In the 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) uses risk management in its approach to implementing 
homeland security, summarizing that “ultimately, homeland security is about effectively 
managing risks to the Nation’s security.”15 
However, implementing effective risk management depends on how people 
perceive and understand risk and uncertainty. How governments, agencies, groups and 
individuals manage limited resources in an uncertain environment often depends upon 
these risk perceptions. The challenge is that risk and uncertainty are complicated 
variables that dramatically impact our decisions and behaviors.16 To gain insight about 
how people perceive risk and uncertainty in homeland security, it is useful to look across 
domains to more mature disciplines, particularly those inspired by risk and the profit it 
can deliver. Stock markets and financial markets are excellent arenas to explore how 
people interact and make decisions when surrounded risk and uncertainty.  
The objective of this thesis is to observe how investors think and react to risk and 
uncertainty in order to seek an appropriate strategy for the homeland security domain. 
This thesis uses a lens of risk and uncertainty through a metaphorical approach that 
compares homeland security and financial markets. The usefulness of the financial 
market metaphor is it allows one to conceptualize homeland security as an investor’s 
financial portfolio that is subject to market volatility, market sentiment and mood, 
investing costs, and market bubbles and busts. Stock market investors empirically test the 
14  Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (The Planet, Nov 2012), 97, Kindle edition. 
15  Department of Homeland Security, Risk Management Fundamentals: Homeland Security Risk 
Management Doctrine (Department of Homeland Security, 2011), 7–8, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/rma-risk-management-fundamentals.pdf.  
16  Paul Slovic et al., “Risk as Analysis and Risk as Feelings: Some Thoughts about Affect, Reason, 
Risk, and Rationality,” Risk Analysis: An International Journal 24, no. 2 (April 2004): 311–322.  
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quantitative and qualitative waters of risk every time they “open their wallets” to buy or 
sell securities. Market participants, whether investors or homeland security practitioners, 
react to risk that is inherent in markets. Neo-classic economic thought and diverse fields 
such as behavioral economics, psychology, prospect theory, and complex systems, 
illustrate why markets behave as they do and how humans understand and react to risk 
and uncertainty (see Figure 2).17  
 
Figure 2.  Thesis word cloud: Visually interpreting the major themes of this 
thesis and how they fit into the picture of homeland security.18  
Using financial markets as a metaphor helps to further explore how a 
nontraditional risk-based strategy of antifragility might apply to an investor’s portfolio 
and by extension, what it can mean to be antifragile in homeland security. More than 
being robust or resilient, which resist or absorb volatility and return to their normal states, 
17  Michael Roszkowski and Geoff Davey, “Risk Perception and Risk Tolerance Changes Attributable 
to the 2008 Economic Crisis: A Subtle but Critical Difference,” Journal of Financial Service Professionals 
64, no. 4 (July, 2010): 42–53; Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decisions Under 
Risk,” Econometrica 47, no. 2 (1979): 263–291; D. Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), 278–288.  
18 Picture from Watch Dog Wire, http://watchdogwire.wpengine.netdna-
cdn.com/florida/files/2013/05/dhs-patch-630x286.jpg. (Word cloud created at created at Tagxedo.com.) 
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strategies that are antifragile benefit from volatility, have more upside than downside, 
adapt and become better than they were.19  
First of all, it is important for the reader to understand what it means by the terms 
homeland security and financial market domains. Let us have Humpty Dumpty tell us 
exactly what studying the homeland security and financial domains means. 
1. To Study the Financial Markets Domain 
Studying the financial domain requires understanding how investors allocate 
limited assets over time under conditions of certainty and uncertainty by pricing assets 
based on their risk level, growth dynamics, and expected rate of return. Individual’s 
behavior is the common denominator between what might be called the homeland 
security domain and the financial markets domain. On the one hand, financial markets 
have huge implications for the solvency of the nation and the general condition of the 
economy. On the other hand, protecting the security and confidence of others in the 
nation’s economy and financial systems is one of the key objectives of the homeland 
security domain.20 
2. To Study the Homeland Security Domain 
To study the homeland security domain is to consider how Americans allocate 
limited resources on a rational or seemingly irrational prioritized risk basis to prevent or 
mitigate terrorist attacks within the United States. This requires reducing the vulnerability 
of the strategic components of American power, which includes the economy and its 
19 Nassim Taleb, Antifragile: Things that Gain from Disorder (New York: Random House, 2012), 
301–335. 
20 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano’s 2nd 
Annual Address on the State of America’s Homeland Security: Homeland Security and Economic 




                                                 
financial domain.21 President Obama expressed the significance of economic power as 
fundamental for American power; “At no time in human history has a nation of 
diminished economic vitality maintained its military and political primacy.”22 
Additionally, homeland security has an important public safety component expressed in 
part by allocation of limited resources for consequence management of disasters whether 
man made by terrorism or caused by a natural phenomenon. 
B. METHOD 
The behaviors of financial markets can be difficult to understand, let alone be 
used to identify applicability to the behaviors of the homeland security domain. However, 
metaphors and analogies are central to thought and reasoning and can facilitate creative 
and imaginative ways to transfer knowledge from an existing domain to newer ones.23  
Lewis Carroll looked at social phenomenon “through a looking glass” using 
metaphors and analogies to analyze some of the social and political practices of his time. 
Using a looking glass of metaphors and analogies and sometimes-literal analysis (see 
Figures 3 and 4), this thesis examines the domains of financial markets and homeland 
security.  
21 James  Kurth cites economic power as the essential base for military and ideological power. See 
“Pillars of the American Century,” http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=688; ADM 
Michael Mullen has in multiple venues cited the national debt as the most significant threat to national 
security. 
22  Barrack Obama, “Remarks by the President at the United States Military Academy at West Point 
Commencement,” May 22, 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-united-
states-military-academy-west-point-commencement.  
23  George Lakoff, “The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor,” in Metaphor and Thought: Second 
Edition, ed. A. Ortony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 202–251.  
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Figure 3.  Metaphorical analysis: Cross domain mapping of homeland 
security and financial markets to form the conceptual metaphor “homeland 
security as a stock market.” Learning is in the conceptual or mental 
domain. 
This thesis uses the conceptual metaphor, homeland security as a stock market in 
order to draw knowledge from financial markets to better understand analogous and 
sometimes irrational behavior of homeland security, especially as it relates to risk and 
uncertainty.24 This thesis leverages Lakoff’s definition of a conceptual metaphor as a 
process of “cross-domain mapping in the conceptual system.”25 Using the financial 
market metaphor acts as a means to explore and apply the concept of antifragility as a 
nontraditional risk management strategy for homeland security. 
24 For example, consider that a homeland security domain might act as an efficient market when 
intelligence permits one to balance threats with countermeasures. Intelligence that is not incorporated into 
the homeland security system enables the development of an inefficient market. Similar to financial 
markets, bubbles of under-protection and over-protection may develop in the homeland security system 
through discontinuous regulations, poor intelligence, complacency, funding anomalies, and irrational 
financial and political pressures. 
25 Lakoff, “The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor,” 202–251. 
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Figure 4.  Literal analysis: Examining the overlay of homeland security and 
financial markets. Learning is by ‘seeing’ attributes, relationships, and 
similarities common to both domains. 
The literature review discusses the advantages and limitations of using metaphor 
and analogies to integrate new information and ideas with prior knowledge. The literature 
review also examines research on risk and uncertainty to better understand their multiple 
dimensions, definitions, and nuances. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The study of homeland security is an emerging discipline when compared to the 
extensive literature describing and analyzing economics and financial markets. Further, 
while there exists abundant writing on stock markets and financial theory, literature 
linking the similarities between financial markets and homeland security is lacking. 
Hence, metaphor and analogies can help to establish these links and generate new 
conceptual avenues for thoughts and ideas. 
Some of the following literature review focuses on exploring existing literature on 
metaphors and analogies in order to create these links, reviewing their advantages and 
limitations. Other literature is used in the Analysis section in a point-by-point 
examination using analogies to build the conceptual metaphor of homeland security as a 
stock market. The review will also evaluate existing literature on risk and uncertainty, 
specifically, the multidimensional aspect of risk, and the many definitions of risk and 
uncertainty. 
Because the terms metaphor and analogy are often used interchangeably, it is 
important to discuss their meaning and how they are used in this thesis. 
A. METAPHOR AND ANALOGIES 
Bratosin and Ionescu cite Aristotle as the “first to provide a systematical approach 
on the understanding of metaphor.”26 According to Aristotle, “Metaphor is the 
application of a strange term either transferred from the genus and applied to the species 
or from the species and applied to the genus, or from one species to another, or else by 
analogy.”27 Merriam-Webster defines metaphor as “a figure of speech in which one word 
or phrase literally denoting one kind of object or idea is used in place of another to 
26  Stefan Bratosin and Mihaela Ionescu, “Knowledge Dynamics - a Metaphorical Approach,” 
Proceedings of the European Conference on Intellectual Capital (Jan 2010): 121.  
27  Aristotle, Poetics, trans. S. H. Butcher (Amazon Digital Services, 2012), 417.  
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suggest a likeness or analogy between them.”28 This definition alludes to the more 
commonly interpreted form of metaphor as a novel linguistic expression. Lakoff and 
Johnson state that “metaphor is for most people a device of the poetic imagination and 
the rhetorical flourish.”29 They describe this linguistic interpretation of metaphor as the 
classic theory of metaphor; yet also argue that this is a “false” interpretation because 
generalizations governing “metaphorical expressions are not in language, but in 
thought.”30 
Lakoff highlights the fundamental use of metaphors for our thought and 
reasoning, explaining that “the locus of metaphor is not in language at all, but in the way 
we conceptualize one mental domain in terms of another.”31 Ricoeur, Gerhart and 
Russell concur, emphasizing the central role metaphors play in thinking, creativity, and 
finding new meaning.32,  
However, Lakoff and Johnson also emphasize that metaphors are also tied to the 
conceptual nature of culture and experiences within that culture. They consider that some 
entailments of metaphor in one culture may be radically different from another.33 Cook 
& Gordon suggest that “cultural and language differences…could make the use of 
metaphors problematic.”34 This suggests that the utility of using financial markets as a 
metaphor for understanding homeland security, and thus risk and uncertainty, may be 
limited to one’s personal understanding and experiences of financial markets. That is to 
say that the value to one person using this approach may be very different than another 
based on their experience with the financial market domain. 
28  Merriam-Webster Online, s.v. “metaphor,” accessed 24 Nov 2013, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/metaphor. 
29  G. Lakoff and M. Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (London: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 3.  
30  Lakoff, The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor, 202.  
31 Ibid. 
32  See M. Gerhart and A. Russel, Metaphoric Process: The Creation of Scientific and Religious 
Understanding (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1984), 133; P. Ricoeur, foreword to 
Metaphoric Process: The Creation of Scientific and Religious Understanding (Fort Worth: Texas Christian 
University Press, 1984).  
33  Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 4.  
34  Stephen Cook and Frances Gordon, “Teaching Qualitative Research: A Metaphorical Approach,” 
Journal of Advanced Nursing 47, no. 6 (Sep 2004): 654.  
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Lakoff defines metaphor as a process of “cross-domain mapping in the conceptual 
system.”35 More than just a linguistic expression, metaphor “can be understood as a 
mapping from a source domain to a target domain.”36 A metaphor conceptualizes how 
we think about one domain in terms of another through this cross-domain mapping. 
Gerhart and Russell describe the making of a metaphor as a process which creates a 
“permanent distortion in our field of meanings…the metaphoric process is the primary 
sculptor of our thinking territory.”37 
Homeland security as a stock market is the conceptual metaphor used in this 
thesis, where the stock market has many characteristics and behaviors that are analogous 
to those found within the homeland security domain. Characteristics and behaviors of the 
two distinct domains are often not apparent until conceptually mapped, creating a new 
domain of meaning. Analogies are key to constructing this conceptual metaphor.38 
Unlike metaphors that conceptualize ideas or concepts across domains, analogies 
compare likeness, attributes, or relationships from one domain to another. Merriam 
Webster defines analogy as an “inference that if two or more things agree with one 
another in some respects they will probably agree in others.”39 Wolfe expands this 
definition as “a figure of speech where one or more relationships among characteristics 
of a base are transferred to a target.”40 Hofstadter and Sander argue that, “analogies lie at 
the very center of human cognition.” Analogies and concepts, they declare, play “the 
starring role, for without concepts there can be no thought, and without analogies there 
can be no concepts.”41 
35  Lakoff, The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor, 202.  
36 Ibid. 
37  Gerhart and Russel, Metaphoric Process, 133.  
38  Lakoff, The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor, 202–208.  
39 Merriam-Webster Online, s.v. “analogy,” accessed 24 Nov 2013, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/analogy. 
40  Christopher R. Wolfe, “Plant a Tree in Cyberspace: Metaphor and Analogy as Design Elements in 
Web-Based Learning Environments,” CyberPsychology & Behavior 4, no. 1 (Feb 2001): 68.  
41  Douglas Hofstadter and Emmanuel Sander, Surfaces and Essences: Analogy as the Fuel and Fire 
of Thinking (New York: Basic, 2013), 592.  
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Linking analogies to metaphors, Bioy and Nègre describe the use of analogies as 
the basis of metaphorical construction.42 Steinhart argues, “analogies often provide 
conditions of meaningfulness and truth for metaphors.”43 Synthesizing this with Lakoff’s 
cross-domain mapping, this thesis uses analogies to map the relationships and behaviors 
of homeland security and stock markets to build the metaphor homeland security as a 
stock market. 
B. RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 
To gain further insight into how people think about risk and uncertainty, one 
should consider the behaviors, actions, and decisions that others make as a result of their 
own understanding and perception of risk and uncertainty. How others perceive and 
define risk is what matters. This is important because as Paul Slovic explains, “our social 
and democratic institutions…breed distrust in the risk arena. Whoever controls the 
definition of risk controls the rational solution to the problem.”44 
Risk and uncertainty are sometimes confused and used synonymously. 
Addressing this, Cooper and Faseruk make clear distinctions between risk, “where 
probabilities are known- and uncertainty- where they are unknown.”45 However, the 
distinction between certainty and uncertainty of probabilities can be often times be 
blurred, especially when risk probabilities prove to be drastically wrong. 
Risk is often described as “the possibility of loss or injury.”46  According to the 
DHS Risk Lexicon, risk is defined as “the potential for an unwanted outcome resulting 
from an incident, event, or occurrence, as determined by its likelihood and the associated 
42  Antoine Bioy and Isabelle Nègre, “Analogy in Metaphors,” European Journal of Clinical Hypnosis 
11, no. 1 (2011): 2–9.  
43  Eric Steinhart, “Analogical Truth Conditions for Metaphors,” Metaphor & Symbolic Activity 9, no. 
3 (1994): 161.  
44  Paul Slovic, “Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics, and Science: Surveying the Risk-Assessment 
Battlefield,” Risk Analysis: An International Journal 19, no. 4 (Aug 1999): 699.  
45  Tom Cooper and Alex Faseruk, “Strategic Risk, Risk Perception and Risk Behaviour: Meta-
Analysis,” Journal of Financial Management & Analysis 24, no. 2 (Jul 2011): 21.  
46 Merriam-Webster Online, s.v. “risk,” accessed 24 Nov 2013, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/risk. 
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consequences.”47  For risk analysis, DHS defines risk as the product of Threat x 
Vulnerability x Consequence.48 
Discussing risk in a financial context, Parker and Stewart show that different 
investment portfolios can have different levels of risk, though their net expected return is 
equal. They describe that the analysis of risky assets “requires consideration of all 
possible outcomes and assessment of the likelihood of the occurrence of each.”49 Risk in 
this context refers to the variability of possible outcomes (usually measured as beta in 
finance). Variability can include historical as well as expected variability based on 
observed momentum and acceleration. This view lends the importance of time when 
considering risk as variability.50 
Some discussions of risk are centered on risk as a reality versus risk as a 
possibility (uncertainty). Rosa’s definition of risk, as described by Merkelsen, is “a 
situation or event where something of human value (including humans themselves) is at 
stake and where the outcome is uncertain.”51  
Aven and Renn incorporate the dimension of uncertainty within the concept of 
risk. They suggest that uncertainty is in the mind of the beholder and that risk cannot be 
grounded on ontological grounds alone. Risk has two key concepts: consequences that 
are real and uncertainty that is “a construct of human imagination to cope with potential 
future outcomes that can become real.”52 
47  Department of Homeland Security, Risk Management Fundamentals, 7–8.  
48  Todd Masse, Siobhan O’Neil and John Rollins, The Department of Homeland Security’s 
Risk Assessment Methodology: Evolution, Issues, and Options for Congress, CRS Report 33858 
(Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Research Service, Feb 2, 2007). 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/80208.pdf. 
49  George Parker and Samuel Stewart Jr., “Risk and Investment Performance,” Financial Analysts 
Journal 30, no. 3 (May 1974): 49.  
50 Ibid. 
51  Henrik Merkelsen, “The Constitutive Element of Probabilistic Agency in Risk: A Semantic 
Analysis of Risk, Danger, Chance, and Hazard,” Journal of Risk Research 14, no. 7 (Aug 2011): 881.  
52  Terje Avena and Ortwin Renn, “On Risk Defined as an Event Where the Outcome is Uncertain,” 
Journal of Risk Research 12, no. 1 (2009): 8.  
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In real-life situations, quantifying uncertainty can be ambiguous, which can cause 
people to be “more averse to ambiguity [uncertainty] than to risk.”53 This leads 
Roskowsky and Davey to discuss risk in terms of what is not known, rather than what is 
known, stating that, “People act on the basis of perceived rather than actual risk.”54 
Similarly, prospect theory suggests that when faced with the prospect of losses and gains, 
people are more risk adverse to losses than to gains.55 This suggests the importance of 
risk perception or dread when evaluating risk, which can involve things as varied as 
emotions, biases, personality, experiences, context and culture. Prospect theory set the 
framework for the study of behavioral economics. This is a growing area of study that 
examines how emotions and human limitations can inhibit rational decision-making 
involving risk vs. reward.56   
Slovic classifies three elements of risk: (a) risk as analysis, (b) risk as politics, and 
(c) risk as feelings. He argues that intuitive feelings “are still the predominant method by 
which human beings evaluate risk.”57 He discovered that people’s decisions and 
judgments were affected by whether they liked something or disliked something. Slovic 
characterized this as the affect heuristic. People who liked something tended to perceive 
risk as low and benefits high; those who disliked something perceive risk as high and 
benefits low. This suggests that judgments, decisions, and behaviors are influenced by 
our risk perception, which depends on not only how we think about things, but also about 
how we feel (affect heuristic).58  
Sandman expands on the notion of risk as feelings by defining risk as equal to 
hazard + outrage. People’s risk perceptions are influenced by various factors such as 
controllability, dread, and fairness, etc. This is often the reason that the public’s risk 
53  Roszkowski and Davey, “Risk Perception and Risk Tolerance,” 44.  
54 Ibid. 
55  Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory,” 263–291.  
56 Robert Shiller, Finance and the Good Society, Kindle edition (New York: Princeton University 
Press, 2012), xiv; Shiller, “Workshop in Behavioral Finance,” 
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/behfin/index.htm 
57  Slovic et al., “Risk as Feelings,” 311.  
58 Ibid. 
 14 
                                                 
perception of events can be quite different from those of experts. In this instance, 
addressing the level of outrage, either increasing or decreasing it, is key to controlling the 
level of perceived risk.59 
There are important parallels in both domains that help explain psychological and 
political behaviors and decisions that manifest themselves in the temporal nature of risk 
taking and risk adversity. The literature suggests that the meaning of risk is really in the 
eye of the beholder. In general, risk is a known probability of loss, while uncertainty is an 
unknown probability of loss. The social sciences have incorporated feelings and emotions 
as a major part of the makeup of risk. Both in finance and in homeland security, 
behavioral science and behavioral economics helps us to understand why people will go 
to great lengths to prevent losses, even if they expect gains. In some instances our 
feelings represent risk as outrage, whether or not associated hazards are indeed real or 
not. In summary, the literature shows that our feelings or general affective view on things 
guides our risk perception and influences our decisions and behaviors.  
   
 
59  P. Sandman, ed., Hazard Versus Outrage in the Public Perception of Risk (New York: Plenum 
Press, 1989): 45–49; S. Dubner and S. Levitt, Freakonomics, Revised and expanded ed. (New York: Harper 
Collins e-books, 2010), 136–139. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. DOMAIN BEHAVIOR – UNDERSTANDING MARKET BEHAVIOR 
 In the journey to understand the conceptual metaphor homeland security 
as a stock market, it is important to understand how stock markets behave and seek 
analogies to homeland security. Financial markets revolve around the continuous flow 
and interpretation of information. Transactions in the market serve as a means of price 
discovery, where investors learn the value of whatever is being traded.60  
There are two primary economic beliefs that explain how financial markets 
operate and behave. The first, the efficient market hypothesis, is the belief that stock 
market prices reflect all available information within the market.61 In such a setting, 
financial markets are efficient. Alternatively, behavioral economists have shed new light 
on the nonefficient nature of financial markets, what one might call the inefficient market 
hypothesis. This is in large part due to research in social sciences reflecting the biases, 
behaviors and feedback of the market participants themselves.  
The complexity market hypothesis incorporates complexity theory to describe the 
behaviors of financial markets. While there is no accepted definition of complexity 
theory, it can be generally described as the study of the interconnected parts of a system 
that exhibit different behaviors from the individual parts and how these interconnected 
parts move from a state of equilibrium to upheaval.62 
1. The Efficient Market  
The efficient market hypothesis was popularized in 1970 by Eugene Fama, for his 
paper entitled, “Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work.” He 
60  Robert Shiller, Finance and the Good Society, 555.  
61  Eugene Fama, “Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work,” Journal of 
Finance 25, no. 2 (May 1970): 383–417.  
62  Mark Buchanan, Ubiquity: Why Catastrophes Happen (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2001), 273; 
Ted Lewis, Bak’s Sand Pile (Williams California: Agile Press, 2011), 46; Melanie Mitchell, Complexity A 
Guided Tour, Kindle edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 335.  
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defines an efficient market as one where prices “fully reflect all available information” at 
any particular moment in time.63 If all available information, including future 
expectations, is incorporated into the prices of stocks, then expected returns can be no 
better than the aggregate return on benchmark index funds. Burton Malkiel, a leading 
proponent of the efficient market hypothesis states that efficient financial markets “do not 
allow investors to earn above-average returns without accepting above-average risks.”64 
As information is incorporated into markets, “stock market price movements,” says 
Malkiel, “approximate those of a random walk. If new information develops randomly, 
then so will market prices, making the stock market unpredictable.”65 The difficulty in 
reliably forecasting changes in prices has often been a testament to the efficiency of the 
markets.  
Malkiel does not doubt that short-term opportunities for investors might exist, due 
to volatile behavior, however he believes that the market would quickly capitalize on this. 
Thus, over longer periods of time, markets always behave in an efficient manner. 
Similarly, Fama does not assert that markets are always efficient and suggests some 
potential sources of market inefficiencies, such as transaction costs, restricted 
information, and different interpretations of information. However, Fama neglects any 
discussion or mention of market bubbles as symptoms of irrational market behavior. 
When viewed over longer periods of time, such as 10–30 years, the efficient 
market hypothesis gives us a useful way to think about systems involving humans and 
transactions.66 This hypothesis shows that in general, those who try to outsmart the 
market fail. However, this hypothesis seems to be based over longer periods of time as 
most literature does not discuss short-term (1–3 years) market fluctuations. This is often 
the period of time where market fluctuations can give the appearance of an inefficient 
market. If the efficient market hypothesis may be a useful way of thinking about the 
63  Fama, “Efficient Capital Markets,” 383.  
64  Burton Malkiel, “The Efficient Market Hypothesis and its Critics,” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 17, no. 1 (Winter 2003): 60.  
65  Burton Malkiel, “Reflections on the Efficient Market Hypothesis: 30 Years Later,” Financial 
Review 40, no. 1 (Feb 2005): 1.  
66 Ibid. 
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behaviors of humans and transactions, how might the homeland security realm exhibit 
similarities of an efficient market? 
An efficient homeland security market can likewise represent a continual flow of 
information and intelligence. This is usually made up of threats and countermeasures. 
With a diverse and active intelligence community, threats are analyzed and their risks 
communicated. Appropriate and proportionate countermeasures are executed as the result 
of thorough and continuous monitoring of the threats in the strategic environment.  
In a homeland security system acting as an efficient market, advantages and 
exploitations from either an adversary perspective (i.e., threats), or from a government 
perspective (i.e., countermeasures) are short lived, as each entity acts and reacts to the 
other and the available information in the environment. Should intelligence detect 
growing or mounting threats (e.g., future expectations of potential attacks), then more 
robust and/or more complex countermeasures must be deployed to deter, or protect 
against the growing threats. In this case, more is at stake and the price or value of the 
exchange between threats and countermeasures increases.  
Adversaries conveying threats are not only terrorist actors and violent extremists. 
Homeland security is also concerned with protecting against and responding to natural 
disasters (e.g., fires, floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, and tornados). These “adversarial” 
events engage and challenge homeland security preparedness, response, and recovery 
countermeasures. Intelligence gathering, analysis and public communication of threats 
are key to executing effective countermeasures. This is rarely a simple proposition. For 
instance, look to the events surrounding Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans to see the 
impacts of failed intelligence and communication on safety and security in the impacted 
region. 
2. The Inefficient Market 
 Pundits of the rational/efficient market theory will point to recent bubbles 
as evidence that this theory is flawed. Economists George Akerlof and Robert Shiller 
argue that conventional understanding of economics does not explain financial roller 
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coaster rides nor the occasional need for government intervention in the markets. 
Explanations for how markets can behave irrationally must consider animal spirits. These 
intangibles include social and investor mood, changing levels of confidence, illusions and 
evil (envy, greed, etc.). Akerlof and Shiller offer anecdotes to underscore their point 
(boom and busts in the stock market, oil market, and the housing crisis).67  
Another example highlighted by Shiller is Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan 
Greenspan’s use of the term “irrational exuberance” to describe the over-heated, and 
overvalued stock market in 1996.68 Despite Greenspan’s early warnings, the market, 
known as the dot-com boom, continued to inflate until it crashed in 2000. Other recent 
financial bubbles include: the 2008–2009 Great Recession; the 1998 Russian financial 
crisis; the 1997 Asian financial crisis; and the 1987 Black Monday, where the stock 
market lost almost 23% in one day.69 Willingness to take on too much risk was a likely 
catalyst for these stock market bubbles. In some cases, risk acceptance was intentional, as 
investors clamored for more return than the market had historically provided. In other 
cases, some investors simply failed to understand risk or discounted it altogether as they 
too easily explained circumstances in the market and society that made this time different 
than the past.  
Many of these examples illustrate a lack of government regulations to guard 
against society’s so-called animal spirits. Akerlof and Shiller discuss how social 
narratives affect the overall public confidence that continues to drive up or down the 
existing economic swings. This becomes a reinforcing feedback loop. Lastly they argue 
that government policy needs to consider these animal spirits if that policy or regulation 
is going to be effective. Financial regulations are generally intended to manage and 
mitigate risk through risk transfer. This can be very relevant to our understanding of how 
regulations are supposed to work in a political or homeland security environment and 
what their unintended effects can be. Akerlof and Shiller fall short, however, in 
67  George Akerlof and Robert Shiller, “How ‘Animal Spirits’ Destabliize Economies,” Mckinsey 
Quarterly, no. 3 (2009): 126–135. 
68  Robert Shiller, “Irrational Exuberance,” http://www.irrationalexuberance.com/definition.htm.  
69  E. S. Browning, “Exorcising Ghosts of Octobers Past,” Wall Street Journal, Oct 15, 2007.  
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describing how to account for these animal spirits. They simply recognize that they exist 
and highly influence the market.70 
In a similar fashion, bubbles can also be seen from a homeland security system 
perspective. Inadequate and inappropriate countermeasures can occur for numerous 
reasons, including but not limited to complacency, fiscal reductions, and not 
understanding or underestimating the dynamic and agile nature of threats. Not having the 
necessary countermeasures in place increases risk in the homeland security system and 
can lead to a vacuum bubble of under-protection. Similar to the stock market, risk is 
sometimes taken on intentionally or accepted; however it can also be taken on 
unintentionally or not understood. The events of 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, and the surprise 
attack on Pearl Harbor are some of the most notable Black Swan events where the United 
States clearly underestimated the threats and indicators from adversaries.71 These 
examples illustrate the lack of imagination and arguably, the willingness, to see the 
developing bubble that would surround them.72  
Perhaps even more common in a post-9/11 environment, though sometimes 
inconspicuous, is a bubble of over-protection, which can entail massive use of resources 
and sometimes include the sacrifice of both individual and the public’s personal liberties 
in exchange for safety. This is enabled through the regulatory process, as part of overly 
employing risk mitigation measures. The stock market analogy would be an overly 
conservative portfolio that returned far less than the market average in order to shun risk 
and preserve assets. However, an overly conservative portfolio can be very costly in 
terms of the missed opportunities for growth. Benjamin Franklin famously said, “They 
who can give up essential liberty, to obtain a little temporary safety, deserve neither 
70  Akerlof and Shiller, “How ‘Animal Spirits’ Destabliize Economies,” 126–135. 
71 Made popular by Nassim Taleb, a Black Swan signifies the occurrence of a low probability, high 
consequence event. Taleb notes that surprise and our innate desire to explain the Black Swan after the fact 
(hindsight), are fundamental characteristics of Black Swans. See Nassim Taleb, The Black Swan: The 
Impact of the Highly Improbable (New York: Random House, 2007)  
72 The attack on Pearl Harbor, which ushered the U.S. into WW II, is often compared with the events 
surrounding 9/11 because of the element of surprise and the transformative nature of the events.  
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liberty nor safety.”73 In homeland security, what is the cost of sacrificing our liberty for 
temporary safety? Over-protection in national and homeland security events might 
include hysteria such as the 1798 Alien and Sedition Acts, the rise of the Red Scare in the 
1950s and arguably the unsustainable post-9/11 buildup of homeland security resources 
and laws allowing the government unprecedented security measures to prevent attacks on 
the homeland.74 
Behavioral economics and behavioral science describes how individual decisions 
are influenced by other individual actions and biases, as well as market mood and 
sentimentality. In many respects, our individual biases lead us to irrational decisions, 
which in turn affect the collective of the overall market sentiment and direction, thus 
affecting the decisions of others. This creates multiple self-sustaining feedback loops, 
which are sometimes seen in the cyclical nature of markets; sometimes emerging as a 
series of booms and busts. Similar behaviors can be described by complex self-
organizing systems. 
3. The Complex Market  
While markets may demonstrate complex interactions and behaviors, economists 
have only recently begun to look towards complexity theory to better explain such market 
behaviors. Complexity theory describes the study of interconnected parts of a system that 
exhibit different behaviors from the individual parts and how these interconnected parts 
have the ability to move from a state of equilibrium to upheaval.75 
Mark Buchanan describes Per Bak’s sand pile model as a metaphor for observing 
and explaining complex systems. In this model, grains of sand are continuously piled on 
top of one another until the pile eventually collapses. What interested Bak, was how big 
73  Benjamin Franklin, Memoirs of the Life and Writings of Benjamin Franklin, Google ebook ed., 
Vol. I (London: A.J. Valphy, 1818), 270.  
74  Charles Doyle, The USA Patriot Act: A Legal Analysis, CRS Report 31377 (Washington, D.C.: 
Library of Congress, Research Service, April 15, 2002), http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31377.pdf; Ron 
Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006), 62–64.  
75  Buchanan, Ubiquity: Why Catastrophes Happen, 273; Mitchell, Complexity A Guided Tour, 335; 
Lewis, Bak’s Sand Pile, 46. 
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the pile might grow and when it would collapse. While some piles grew comparatively 
large and unstable before collapsing, other piles collapsed when relatively small. 
Repeating this phenomenon thousands of times using computers showed that the point of 
collapse is chaotic and cannot be predicted precisely. Buchannan concluded his findings 
by citing the ubiquitous nature of the critical self-organizing state in networks found 
throughout all things. All upheavals show some nature of self-organized criticality, 
including pandemics, hurricanes, forest fires, terrorism and financial market bubbles.76  
Economist Hyman Minsky discusses the paradox of financial market tendencies 
to go from stability to fragility in his Financial Instability Hypothesis. Minsky writes, 
“over periods of prolonged prosperity, the economy transits from financial relations that 
make for a stable system to financial relations that make for an unstable system.”77 This 
suggests the inherent need for volatility in complex systems, without which, systems 
would become unstable (bubble) to the point of dramatic collapse. Reflecting on 
Minsky’s work, economic authors Mauldin and Tepper declare that, “the longer the 
period of stability, the higher the potential risk for even greater instability when market 
participants must change their behavior.”78 After prolonged periods of stability, this 
change in behavior is often sudden, leading to collapses or signifying the bursting of a 
bubble. This builds upon the sand pile idea that both stable and instable systems are 
dependent on time and volatility, including the domains of financial markets and 
homeland security.  
Andrew Haldane draws analogies from the complexities of ecological food webs 
as a model descriptor of the interplay between complexity and stability in financial 
ecosystems. Haldane calls for the need to address and emphasize systemic risk in the 
banking system rather than address individual bank risks. In the run up to the 2008 
financial crisis, banks increasingly relied on trading derivatives, structured credit, and 
financial engineering as a means to generate trading profits while spreading risk 
76  Buchanan, Ubiquity: Why Catastrophes Happen, 273.  
77  Hyman P. Minsky, “The Financial Instability Hypothesis: An Interpretation of Keynes and an 
Alternative to ‘Standard’ Theory,” Challenge 20 (Mar 1977): 20.  
78  John Maudlin and Jonathan Tepper, Endgame: The End of the Debt Supercycle and How it 
Changes Everything (Hoboken: Wiley and Sons, 2011), 37–38.  
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throughout the financial system.79 This led to an increase in banking homogeneity, where 
all banks tended to do the same thing. Haldane notes, “Excessive homogeneity within a 
financial system…can minimize risk for each individual bank, but maximize the 
probability of the entire system collapsing.”80  
This is a classic example of Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons. In Hardin’s 
example, a common resource is shared by all, with each individual attempting to 
maximize their use of the resource to the detriment of the others. This excessive 
homogeneity comes with the expense of greater systematic risk; ultimately destroying the 
commons and collapsing the system. “Therein is the tragedy,” Hardin notes, as man 
pursues “his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. 
Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.”81 Hardin’s proposed approach to this problem 
is not directly forcing behavioral changes, but rather by not maintaining a commons. This 
can be accomplished through social arrangements such as taxes, fees or regulations that 
allocate costs to those users who benefit the most.82  For instance, the 9/11-security fee 
charged to airline passengers could be described as one means of charging for the use of 
the commons. Passengers and other stakeholders who benefit the most should also 
contribute the most. 
Haldane has proposed a similar approach to the problem of the financial 
ecosystem commons, as seen through excessive banking homogeneity. To reduce 
banking homogeneity and increase financial ecosystem diversity, there must be larger 
liquidity and capital ratios requirements proportionate to the size of the bank.83 This may 
mean that some banks would have to breakup or would prefer to breakup rather than 
maintain larger capital ratio requirements. Additionally, developing incentive based 
requirements may also help increase systemic banking diversity.  
79 Andrew G. Haldane and Robert M. May, “Systemic Risk in Banking Ecosystems,” Nature 469, no. 
7330 (Jan 20, 2011, 2011): 351–5; Lawrence J. White, “Preventing Bubbles: What Role for Financial 
Regulation?” CATO Journal 31, no. 3 (Fall 2011): 603–619. 
80  Haldane and May, Systemic Risk in Banking Ecosystems, 351–5.  
81  Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science 162, no. 3859 (13 Dec 1968), 1244.  
82  Ibid., 1243–1248. 
83  Haldane and May, Systemic Risk in Banking Ecosystems, 351–5.  
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In the homeland security realm, this suggests the question: Has terrorism become 
a homogenous catch phrase within DHS? Are the activities and growth of DHS driven 
and sustained in large part by the fear of terrorism? Highlighting this, Congress defines 
homeland security in four elements, each of which is exclusively centered around 
terrorism.84 Just as excessive homogeneity among banks led to increased systemic risk 
and eventually financial collapse, is the fear of terrorism leading to excessive 
homogeneity within homeland security? If so, does this suggest a similar path towards 
collapse?  
Using the sand pile analogy, Haldane’s ideas might reflect the forcing of smaller 
homeland security sand pile collapses before they are allowed to grow too big. While this 
would serve to increase the overall volatility of the system, it would likely reduce the 
fragility of the homeland security system by minimizing the potential for catastrophic 
market bubbles and sand pile collapses.  
While research in behavioral economics shows that markets can exhibit inefficient 
behaviors, how do we reconcile evidence that markets are both efficient and inefficient? 
The complex market hypothesis may be a better way to understand both the efficient and 
inefficient nature of markets involving human interactions. Evidence for and against 
efficient, inefficient, or complexity-based markets should not be viewed as conclusive. 
These hypotheses inform us how markets or systems as a whole tend to behave over 
certain periods of time. Analogies link these aggregate behaviors to the homeland 
security domain. Examining how we think about risk, uncertainty, and behavioral and 
systemic biases will also inform our understanding of the behavior of markets, both 
financial and homeland security markets. 
84  Assessing DHS Ten Years Later: How Wisely is DHS Spending Taxpayer Dollars?:Before the 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency, House Committee on Homeland Security (Feb 15, 
2013) (Written Testimony by Shawn Reese, Congressional Research Analyst). The four elements which 
Congress uses to define homeland security are: (1) to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; (2) 
to reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism; (3) to minimize damage from a terrorist attack 
in the United States; and (4) to recover from a terrorist attack in the United States.    
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B. MANAGING AND MITIGATING RISK 
1. Regulations 
Regulations are a key method for governments to try to manage risks and promote 
the well being of society.85 In financial markets, risk can be mitigated and managed 
through the use of regulations. Glass-Stegall, Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank, market 
manipulation rules, and insider trading laws are just some of the many examples that 
attempt to regulate risk in the financial markets, maintain efficient markets and reduce the 
chance of bubbles from forming.  
George Akerlof argues that information in markets is often asymmetric, where 
information between the buyer and seller can be unequal. In these instances, government 
intervention is sometimes necessary to protect buyers, and thus preserve and minimize 
risk in the marketplace. His point is that in practice, we see all sorts of inefficiencies and 
the government has a role in attempting to create a more fair and efficient market through 
regulations.86  
However, sometimes regulations have unintended consequences; many are too 
restrictive and limit market/economic freedoms and growth, while others may be 
subverted through loopholes. Some regulations can sometimes be built upon faulty 
assumptions and can introduce unintended risk into the market place. A good example of 
this was the 2001 Recourse Rule, which offered incentives for banks to hold securitized 
mortgages rather than the mortgages themselves. With securitized mortgages, banks 
bundled actual mortgages into one large pool and then sliced the pool into smaller pieces 
or tranches based on the inherent risk of default of each mortgage. This allowed the 
mortgages to be resold to investors based on a risk profile, similar to a bond. While this 
85  Mark G. Stewart, Bruce R. Ellingwood and John Mueller, “Homeland Security: A Case Study in 
Risk Aversion for Public Decision-Making,” International Journal of Risk Assessment & Management 15, 
no. 5 (July 2011), 367–386; Shiller, Finance and the Good Society, 555. 
86  George Akerlof, “The Market for ‘Lemons: Quality, Uncertainty, and the Market Mechanism,’” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 (1970): 488–500. 
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allowed banks to free up capital to increase lending, it also contributed to creating more 
systemic risk, ultimately culminating in the financial crisis in 2008.87   
Legislation, as the regulating entity, also plays an important role in managing and 
limiting risk in the homeland security system. Notable examples include the USA Patriot 
Act and subsequent amendments, the 2002 Homeland Security Act, Post-Katrina 
Emergency Management Act, Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, as well as other fiscal and authorization 
based laws. By defining and mostly expanding how the government can respond to 
threats, regulations attempt to mitigate homeland security risk and lessen the chance of a 
bubble of under-protection in the homeland security system. However, as previously 
mentioned, regulations can also be too restrictive and limit individual freedoms or be 
ineffective and be subverted with loopholes. This can result in a misunderstanding of risk 
or believing that less risk exists in the system than there is. 
2. Derivatives 
Financial derivatives are widely attributed as being a leading cause of the collapse 
of the financial bubble in 2008.88 A derivative, as its name implies, is a product that 
derives its value from another product. Derivatives are commonly used to bet on the 
future value of something, usually commodities. Farmers have used derivatives for 
hundreds of years to protect their crops from fluctuating prices due to changes in weather. 
Derivatives can be speculative in nature or can act as insurance by transferring risk from 
one party to a counterparty or even the entire financial system. 
The idea of the Credit Default Swap (CDS) grew from the use of derivatives in 
the commodities market. A CDS is a type of derivative that insures a loan against a 
default. In the late 1990s, financial companies issued credit derivatives on individual 
company debt and later shifted to writing derivatives on bundles of debt to form a 
portfolio of credit risk. This debt was securitized, or sold by slicing it into tranches of 
87  Shiller, Finance and the Good Society, 555. 
88  Carol Loomis, “Derivatives: The Risk that Still Won’t Go Away,” Fortune, July 6, 2009, 55–60.  
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debt risk, creating Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs).89 This financial innovation 
created a new market for buying and selling financial insurance and offered new 
opportunities for profits. Risk could now be easily traded and transferred into the future 
and credit derivatives made it possible for banks to skirt capital requirements. 
Many in finance at the time believed that risk to the firm could be eliminated 
using these derivatives. However, rather than eliminating risk, it spread throughout the 
banking system. As more derivatives were written and traded, the risk inherent within the 
financial system grew exponentially. Between 2000 and 2008, “the world-wide notional 
value of derivatives went from $95 trillion to $684 trillion.”90  
Obfuscating the growing level of systemic risk was the fact that the derivatives 
market was and still is a private market; unregulated and out of view. The common 
denominator of these mortgage-backed securities was the health or solvency of the 
housing market. For Wall Street to continue to make profits from these mortgage-backed 
securities, the prices of homes across the nation had to continue to rise so the system of 
payments remained solvent. When the prices of homes reversed course, a freeze on loans 
suddenly occurred due to insolvency of the system, and the public trust and confidence in 
the housing market collapsed. The financial instruments built on these housing 
foundations became untenable. Just as all of Bak’s Sandpiles eventually come crashing 
down, so too did the financial markets. 
Similarities can be seen in total government debt and unfunded entitlements and 
liabilities. The economy is a fundamental of American power and the foundation for 
homeland and national security. However, fiscal realities have shed new light on the 
89  Frontline, Money, Power and Wall Street, directed by Michael Kirk, Season 30, episode 10, 2012; 
CDOs made it easier to sell bundles of debt to investors, who could choose how much risk they were 
willing to take. The next application of CDOs was to portfolios of consumer credit risk, namely mortgage 
credit risk. Other financial innovations, such as Synthetic CDOs, and CDO2 (CDOs of CDOs) grew out of 
this process. Writing these derivatives proved to be very profitable for banks. Existing regulations, such as 
the Recourse Rule, allowed banks to bypass existing capital requirements by offering “special incentives 
for banks to hold securitized mortgages rather than mortgages themselves.” See Shiller, Finance and the 
Good Society, 1529–1546. 
90  Loomis, Derivatives, 57.  
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emerging financial threat to homeland security and national security.91 The U.S. Treasury 
noted in a 2011 financial report that the government must bring “expenses and resources 
into balance before the deficit and debt reach unprecedented heights.” As recently as 
August 2012, the total U.S. government debt to Gross Domestic product ratio exceeded 
108%.92 
Just as unregulated financial derivatives generated systemic risk within the 
financial sector, the growth of unfunded entitlements and liabilities has introduced a 
growing level of systemic risk to the financial health of the U.S. According to the 
Treasury Department’s 2012 financial statement, unfunded Social Security and Medicare 
obligations exceed $66.3 trillion.93  At well over four times the reported debt level, a 
GAO audit notes that “absent policy changes—the federal government continues to face 
an unsustainable fiscal path.”94 This suggests that similar to financial derivatives, the 
U.S. is underwriting insurance on making future payments; transferring obligations and 
risk into the future.  
The unsustainable growth of U.S. government debt is endangering the public’s 
confidence in the government’s ability to repay the debt. Government debt is derived 
from the public trust and confidence that investors will always be repaid. This has led to 
the assumption that U.S. government securities are risk-free securities. However, investor 
confidence in this assumption may start to wane as deficits continue to grow unabated. In 
this instance, investors will no longer buy the debt derivatives of the U.S. government, 
risking a collapse of the financial engine of the country and posing a real threat to the 
91 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Homeland Security and Economic Security;” ADM 
Michael Mullen has in multiple venues cited the national debt as the most significant threat to national 
security. 
92  Bureau of Economic Analysis, “National Income and Product Accounts: Gross Domestic Product, 
2nd Quarter 2013,” U.S. Department of Commerce, 
http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/gdpnewsrelease.htm; Treasury Direct, “The Daily History 
of the Debt Results,” U.S. Department for the Treasury, http://www.treasurydirect.gov/NP/debt/current. As 
of Oct 24, 2013 the Total U.S. Debt was $ $17,077.7 billion and the 2nd Qtr GDP (real) was $15,679.7 
billion. 
93  Department of the Treasury, Fiscal Year 2012 Financial Report of the United States Government, 
189, http://www.fms.treas.gov/fr/12frusg/12frusg.pdf.  
94 Ibid., 225. 
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security and well being of the nation. Without the foundation of a strong economy, there 
is nothing to support a diverse and robust homeland security enterprise. 
3. Career and Political Risk 
Career risk also plays into the overall risk appetite of the financial market. 
“Professional investors find it hard to wait out an overpriced market,” and many have lost 
their jobs refusing to buy booming stocks.95 Likewise, holding losing stocks can be just 
as harmful to the careers of fund managers. The hazards of buying high or selling low are 
real, but in many instances, not owning winning stocks can drive the overall risk picture 
for fund managers. Using Sandman’s definition of risk, fund managers must address both 
the hazards and the outrage of their clients.96 This suggests that fund managers end up 
chasing the market to keep their jobs and reputation to give the illusion that funds hold 
winning stocks.  
Political career risk also plays a part in the overall risk appetite of the homeland 
security system. Shortly after the events of 9/11, there was little appetite for risk in the 
homeland security system. In a CNN Poll conducted the day after the 9/11 attacks, “66% 
of Americans surveyed said they would be willing to give up some of their liberties” to 
fight and prevent terrorism.97 Similarly, Gallup polling conducted within one month after 
the 9/11 attacks showed that 59% of those polled were worried that they or a member of 
their family would become a victim of a terrorist attack, while 88% expressed their 
confidence in the government’s ability to protect its citizens from future terrorist 
attacks.98 While polls are certainly not perfect, they can be a useful proxy of the nation’s 
feelings and attitudes at the time. These results suggest that fear and anger gripped the 
95  Pat Reginer, “Can You Outsmart the Market?” Fortune, Dec 21, 2009, 58.  
96  Sandman, Hazard Versus Outrage, 45–49.  
97  Liana Epstein and Phillip Atiba Goff, “Safety Or Liberty?: The Bogus Trade-Off of Cross-
Deputization Policy,” Analyses of Social Issues & Public Policy 11, no. 1 (Dec 2011): 314–324. 
98  Gallup, “Terrorism in the United States,” http://www.gallup.com/poll/4909/terrorism-united-
states.aspx.  
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nation and action was expected from the government. Politicians had to address both the 
terrorism hazards as well as the public’s outrage following the 9/11 attacks.99 
Addressing hazards and outrage in a post-9/11 environment, the Bush 
Administration adopted what Ron Suskind calls the “one percent doctrine.” This is a 
response oriented terrorism philosophy attributed to Vice President Cheney that argues 
that even a one percent chance or risk of terrorism needed to be taken as a certainty. 
Suskind notes that Cheney declares, “It’s not about our analysis, or finding a 
preponderance of evidence, it’s about our response.”100  This suggests that post-9/11, the 
Administration’s response to terrorism risk was that it was something to be eliminated 
not mitigated. This had to be achieved by targeting both the hazards of terrorism as well 
as managing the public’s outrage.  
In a similar respect, public outrage from terrorism can demand homeland security 
leadership to adjust and employ numerous and often-costly antiterrorism activities, even 
if these actions cannot be proven effective. Many antiterrorism activities and programs 
are deterrent oriented. GAO notes that the success and effectiveness of some deterrent 
based programs, such as the TSA’s airport security screening or the Coast Guard’s port 
security activities, are unknown due to a lack of data or evidence that such programs have 
stopped or caught terrorists.101 Deterrence programs attempt to prevent an event, which 
makes measuring the absence of an event difficult. With these and similar programs, their 
effectiveness in reducing actual hazards is unclear.  
On the other hand, one might infer that these programs have had an impact on the 
public’s risk perception and feeling more secure, thus mitigating the outrage related to 
terrorism. Using Gallop polls as a proxy for public sentiment, in January 2002, 51% 
99  Sandman, Hazard Versus Outrage, 45–49.  
100  Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine, 62–64.  
101  TSA has made Progress, but Additional Efforts are Needed to Improve Security: Hearings Before 
the Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management, House Committee on Homeland Security 
(Sep 16, 2011) (Written testimony by Stephen Lord, Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues, 
U.S. Government Accountability Office), http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/126981.pdf; U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, Coast Guard: Security Risk Model Meets DHS Criteria, But More Training Could 
Enhance its Use for Managing Programs and Operations, GAO-12-14 (Nov 2011), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587144.pdf. 
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responded that they were satisfied with the nation’s security from terrorism. Ten years 
later, this number swelled to 71%.102 Though the effectiveness of many antiterrorism 
activities is unclear, sometimes investors are happier knowing that they own “winning” 
stocks, regardless of their actual portfolio returns. 
C. PREDICTING THE MARKET – BIASES IN RISK DECISION MAKING 
Accounting for personal biases can make timing the stock market or the homeland 
security market a recipe for disaster. Even if one believes in a rational/efficient market 
theory, the fact that bubbles still form demonstrates that sometimes markets can act 
incredibly irrational. At any given point in time, reviewing basic market statistics, such as 
price to earnings or book values will show that sometimes stocks are more expensive, and 
at other times less so. This fact is what drives many individuals and market professionals 
to time the market or make market-based predictions. However, most market experts are 
woefully unsuccessful in market timing. In 2009, only one third of all large-capitalized 
stock mutual funds matched or beat the market (S&P 500) over a five-year period.103 
These poor performance metrics highlight the difficulty in reliably forecasting price 
changes and are a testament to the efficiency of the markets. 
In timing the homeland security market, numbers and statistics are often more 
elusive, especially when it concerns predictions. Can one effectively time the homeland 
security market by employing just-in-time countermeasures in response to emergent or 
growing threats? If an attack does not occur, were countermeasures effective? If an attack 
does occur, were countermeasures ineffective and worthless?  
Even without definitive statistics, can expert intelligence in the market make it 
possible to gauge the level of threats, evaluate countermeasures, and understand the level 
of risk in the system? If the underperformance of experts in the financial domain is any 
indication, experts timing the homeland security market may prove just as poor. A 
leading reason for this is our personal biases impact our ability to accurately gauge and 
102  Gallup, “Terrorism in the United States.”  
103  Reginer, “Can You Outsmart the Market?,” 58.  
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correctly interpret information in the market. Understanding the role biases play in 
decision-making may allow us to better account for our own shortcomings when it comes 
to evaluating risk and understanding uncertainty.  
1. Expert Predictions 
In an efficient market, future prices of securities defy prediction. This suggests 
that, in a more literal comparison, both financial and homeland security experts are hard 
pressed to differentiate their opinions and predictions from those of the average person. 
Taleb describes how overconfidence, especially among experts, often leads to sub-
optimal as well as devastating predictions. He describes research citing thousands of 
predictions by financial security analysts that ultimately predicted “nothing.”104    
Similar to financial security analysts predicting nothing, psychologist Philip 
Tetlock conducted a study in which nearly 300 experts made over 80,000 predictions of 
various political, military, and economic events in the near future. These experts 
consisted of a mix of noted homeland security, national security, and economic 
professionals. Tetlock was curious to see if expert knowledge across the security and 
financial domains had any link to being able to make more accurate predictions than 
simple algorithms or by someone who was not an expert. The conclusions of the study 
revealed that “across all judgments, experts on their home turf made neither better 
calibrated nor more discriminating forecasts than did dilettante trespassers.”105 From this 
study, Tetlock deduced that when making predictions by noted experts, “it is impossible 
to find any domain in which humans clearly outperformed crude extrapolation 
algorithms” - what Tetlock calls “the functional equivalent of dart-throwing chimps.”106 
Of course experts have “too great a vested interest in self-promotion to cease and 
desist from supplying snake oil forecasting products.”107 Those experts in demand tend 
104  Nassim Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (New York: Random 
House, 2007), 150.  
105  Philip Tetlock, Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know? (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2005), 54.  
106 Ibid., 41, 54.  
107 Ibid., 62–63. 
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to be overconfident in their predictions, which in turn may drive more exposure and 
attention by the media. As Tetlock describes, “authoritative-sounding experts, the ratings-
conscious media, and the attentive public—may thus be locked in a symbiotic 
triangle.”108  
In spite of the poor track record of experts in forecasting, we should not expect 
our reliance on expert prognostications to wane. As humans, we seem to strive for 
simplification and explanation of events in cause and effect narratives. This might 
suggest our belief in modern fatalism, where the future is a linear derivation of the past 
and present. Tetlock summarizes this by describing: 
…our reluctance to acknowledge the unequivocal evidence that experts 
cannot out predict chimps keeps us needlessly looking for predictive cues 
and heuristics well beyond the point of diminishing returns. We—the 
consumers of expert pronouncements—are in thrall to experts for the same 
reasons that our ancestors submitted to shamans and oracles: our 
uncontrollable need to believe in a controllable world and our flawed 
understanding of the laws of chance. We lack the willpower and good 
sense to resist the snake oil products on offer. Who wants to believe that, 
on the big questions, we could do as well tossing a coin as by consulting 
accredited experts?109  
Additionally, the relationship between experts, the attentive public, and the media 
can tend to drive and influence herding patterns across all groups. Similar to Tetlock, 
Taleb notes how behavioral traits such as greed and illogical rationalization induces 
herding patterns and prediction errors.110 Kahneman goes farther, explaining how 
overconfidence is highly valued, both socially and economically. The competitive 
pressure for experts to be valued “creates powerful forces that favor a collective 
blindness to risk and uncertainty.”111 
Relating to herding patterns of experts, Kahneman gives insight into the wisdom 
of the crowds. This belief, first popularized by James Surowwiecki’s book of the same 
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid., 63. 
110  Taleb, The Black Swan, 150–164.  
111  Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, 262.  
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name, shows that while individuals often do very poorly at judgments and predictions, 
pools of judgments can be quite accurate. However, Kahneman notes that this holds true 
only when individual judgments and their errors are made independent of each other. In 
other words, when individual observations are not subject to any systematic bias, the 
errors of their judgments average to zero. However, “if the observers share a bias, the 
aggregation of judgments will not reduce it. Allowing the observers to influence each 
other effectively reduces the size of the sample, and with it the precision of the group 
estimate.”112  
In a similar fashion, wisdom of the crowds can be a good descriptor of efficient 
markets. However, as Kahneman notes, once systematic biases are introduced, the market 
can quickly become inefficient. In todays more dynamic and interconnected social and 
economic settings, it is hard to imagine when we are not actually subject to group or 
shared biases. This suggests that the crowds and experts are not as smart as we think.  
Concerning shared biases, groupthink plays a significant a role in shaping the 
wisdom of the crowd by creating systematic herding patterns. Groupthink describes how 
a group can take on norms that can be arbitrary and incorrect and how these norms 
influence behaviors and decisions. Irving Janis first described groupthink in 1972 
studying the impact of group policy decisions on fiascoes such as Pearl Harbor, the 
Korean War, the Bay of Pigs, and the escalation of Vietnam.113 According to Janis, 
groupthink describes a “concurrence-seeking tendency that fosters over-optimism, lack of 
vigilance, and sloganistic thinking about the weakness and immorality of out-groups.”114 
In all instances, group uniformity and loyalty took precedence in decision-making, even 
when a “policy was working badly and had unintended consequences that disturbed the 
conscience of the members.”115 This group loyalty acted as a barrier to individual 
member dissent or from raising controversial issues.   
112 Ibid. 
113  Irving L. Janis, “Groupthink and Group Dynamics: A Social Psychological Analysis of Defective 
Policy Decisions,” Policy Studies Journal 2, no. 1 (1973): 19–25.  
114 Ibid., 20. 
115 Ibid., 21. 
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Subsequent research points to groupthink as a contributing factor for the two 
NASA shuttle explosions, the Iraq invasion in 2003, and the financial collapse of AIG, 
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Lehman Brothers.116 This suggests that the pervasive 
affects of groupthink impact experts and nonexperts alike.  
The failure of the prognosticative powers of both economic and homeland 
security experts suggests a marked similarity to the behaviors of efficient markets, where 
future market prices defy even expert predictions. In this instance prices of stocks in the 
homeland security market fully reflect all available information. Political analysis of 
share price fundamentals is already taken into consideration in the price, thus making 
expert predictions as to the direction of the market no more than educated, or at times, 
wild guesses. This casts further doubt on the value of national and homeland security 
experts and should give us pause to question our confidence and reliance in expert 
opinion and predictions, whether in the finance or the homeland security realm. 
Successful investing often requires diversification, ignoring stock tips, and at times 
contrarian thinking.  
2. On Black Swans 
Biases also play a major role in interfering with our ability to interpret and 
understand our actual exposure and susceptibility to Black Swan events.117 A Black 
Swan is a low probability, high consequence event that Taleb states has three attributes: 
“First, it is an outlier, as it lies outside the realm of regular expectations, because nothing 
in the past can convincingly point to its possibility. Second, it carries an extreme impact. 
Third, in spite of its outlier status, human nature makes us concoct explanations for its 
occurrence after the fact, making it explainable and predictable.”118  
Taleb’s definition suggests that Black Swans are in fact relative in the eyes of the 
beholder. A Black Swan by its nature implies surprise as it emerges beyond the realm of 
116  Roland Bénabou, “Groupthink: Collective Delusions in Organizations and Markets,” Review of 
Economic Studies 80, no. 2 (Apr 2013): 429–462.  
117  Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, 278–288.  
118  Taleb, The Black Swan, xvii-xviii.  
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our regular expectations. However, what is unexpected to one person may in fact be 
predictable to a certain degree by others. Sometimes known as “Gray Swans,” these are 
rare, high consequence events but somewhat calculable. Earthquakes, fires, wars, and the 
next stock market crash technically make up Gray Swans. However, even Gray Swans 
can surprise us. Forgetting that something is random or anticipating a particular Black 
Swan, what Taleb calls “tunneling,” can leave you ignorant to the facts of the realm of 
other possibilities.119  
Kahneman and Tversky discuss prospect theory to show how our biases affect our 
decisions when faced with risk of varying probabilities. This theory shows that rare 
events (low probability) are underweighted and often ignored when we lack experience 
from the event or when we fail to imagine it.120 Discussing the risk of rare events, Taleb 
notes that “we tend to underestimate both the probabilities and the damage.”121 He 
describes how we are becoming more globally interconnected, and thus are more 
vulnerable to setbacks and Black Swans, yet we continue to build riskier systems with 
greater risks of failure. Alternatively, prospect theory suggests that recent rare events are 
overestimated and thus overweighted because of confirmatory bias of memory. 
Kahneman uses examples such as playing the lottery or terrorism to show how the 
vividness of memory can make “the actual probability inconsequential; only possibility 
matters.”122  
Another principle of prospect theory is loss aversion. When we make decisions, 
we are often faced with the prospect of losses and gains. Loss aversion describes the 
larger emotional impact that losses have over gains. “Losses loom larger than gains,” 
notes Kahneman.123 Though a choice may have a positive expected value, loss aversion 
causes us to shun the possibility of loss at the risk of missing out on potentially positive 
outcomes. As humans, we are “guided by the immediate emotional impact of gains and 
119 Ibid., 138–150. 
120  Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory,” 263–291.  
121  Nassim Taleb, “What’s Next for Nuclear Power?,” Fortune, Apr 11, 2011, 102.  
122  Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, 323.  
123 Ibid., 282. 
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losses,” explains Kahneman.124 The prospect of losses is perceived as inherently more 
risky than the prospect of gains, despite any positive expected value. Here, Slovic’s risk 
as feelings is especially relevant, as our feelings guide our perception of risk, and thus 
our decisions.125 Related to loss aversion, emotional framing impacts how we view losses 
and costs. Kahneman explains that when compared against each other, “losses evokes 
stronger negative feelings than costs.”126  
Loss aversion is especially relevant in both the stock market and homeland 
security. When stocks undergo an unexpected drop, the emotional toil of sudden losses 
can drive investors to sell, even at a loss. Selling at a loss is the cost of preventing further 
losses and perhaps why it is so hard to buy low and sell high. Similarly, the concept of 
loss aversion and risk as feelings make it easier to understand the public’s emotional 
reactions following a terrorist attack. People fear the uncertainty and possibility of future 
losses from terrorism; Sandman might argue that this is manifested as outrage (risk = 
hazard + outrage). As losses loom larger than costs, people will be willing to pay extra 
rather than face the potential for more losses.  
Our susceptibility to Black Swan type events are also impacted by our hindsight 
and overconfidence biases. Defined as “an unjustified increase in the perceived 
probability of an event due to outcome knowledge,” hindsight bias plays a considerable 
factor in understanding the past as a linear extension of the future.127 Fischhoff first 
described hindsight bias in 1975, as “creeping determinism” to describe our tendency to 
view the past with less uncertainty than originally experienced. Fischhoff highlights how 
in the long run, unperceived creeping determinism “can seriously impair our ability to 
judge the past or learn from it.”128 Economist Kenneth French explains that, “We’re all 
124 Ibid., 287. 
125 Slovic et al., “Risk as Feelings,” 311–322. 
126 Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, 364. 
127  Robert P. Agans and Leigh S. Shaffer, “The Hindsight Bias: The Role of the Availability Heuristic 
and Perceived Risk,” Basic & Applied Social Psychology 15, no. 4 (Dec 1994): 439–449.  
128  Baruch Fischhoff, “Hindsight is Not Equal to Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on 
Judgment Under Uncertainty,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 
1, no. 3 (1975): 311.  
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overconfident, and one of the sources of that is the simplicity of looking backwards.”129 
We all want to be part of a rising tide of increasing stock prices, gold prices, or house 
prices. Hindsight of increasing prices lends us a glimpse of where these prices might 
continue to go, and we want in. For instance, from 1989 to 2008 the stock market gained 
just over 8% a year, but the average investor earned less than 2% thanks to 
overconfidence and lousy timing.130 
Behavioral science lends clues to help understand our inability to buy low and sell 
high. As Kahneman notes, “hindsight bias has pernicious effects on the evaluation of 
decision makers.”131 The context, risk, and uncertainty of the situation are often lost to a 
clear outcome bias, where decisions are based not on the quality of the process but on 
pure outcome alone. In financial terms, this is apparent in the annual return on portfolios 
or funds. Emphasis is placed not on the process or investment strategy, but rather on the 
bottom-line. Kahneman suggests that there is a direct correlation to the consequence of 
the outcome and the level of hindsight bias. He illustrates the events and intelligence 
leading up to 9/11 as an example of our beliefs that officials were “negligent or blind” to 
the ensuing events to come. On July 10, 2001, CIA information that al-Qaeda might be 
planning an attack on the U.S. was relayed to the National Security Advisor, Condoleezza 
Rice rather than the President. As the facts later emerged, Kahneman notes that, “Ben 
Bradlee, the legendary executive editor of the Washington Post, declared, ‘It seems to me 
elementary that if you’ve got the story that’s going to dominate history you might as well 
go right to the president.’ But on July 10, no one knew—or could have known—that this 
tidbit of intelligence would turn out to dominate history.”132 
This is not to discredit that leadership should be held accountable for the outcome 
of decisions. In fact, decision makers expect this and often result to more bureaucratic 
solutions and procedures, or even consulting experts to justify their decisions. Kahneman 
notes that this can lead to an extreme reluctance to take risks. Alternatively, hindsight and 
129  Reginer, “Can You Outsmart the Market?,” 58.  
130 Ibid. 
131  Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, 203.  
132 Ibid., 204 
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outcome bias can also bring unwarranted rewards to irresponsible risk seekers. “Leaders 
who have been lucky are never punished for having taken too much risk. A few lucky 
gambles can crown a reckless leader with a halo of prescience and boldness.”133  
However, even a savvy financial advisor or fund manager knows that they must 
continually be anointed with luck to best the market year after year.  
While Black Swans can be both good and bad, we often fail to learn from them or 
take advantage of any opportunities they might present. For example, our tendency to use 
past events to judge todays and tomorrows events can often times make us overconfident 
when evaluating and judging risk and uncertainty. Shiller discusses how overconfidence 
bias stems from biased self-attribution, first identified by Daryl Bern. When our actions 
are confirmed by good events, we usually attribute this to our skills. When something 
negative occurs, we are quick to attribute bad luck.134  
Taleb highlights how overconfidence in our decisions and abilities, and a lack of 
evidence of negative events, gives us a false sense of security. “That we got here by 
accident does not mean we should continue to take the same risks,” declares Taleb.135 
This is what Taleb describes as thinking like a turkey. Just because you are well fed, fat 
and happy, does not mean that Thanksgiving is not around the corner. Investors can be 
guilty of being the turkey as they seek to invest in known, retrospective winners and shun 
the losers. Additionally, financial firms are eager to highlight their past successes, while 
making sure the fine print, “past performance does not necessarily predict future results,” 
is as small as possible.136  
Whereas investors might look to winning stocks as indications of future 
performance, in the homeland security realm, a lack of terrorist attacks sometimes 
implies evidence of a successful antiterrorism strategy. Governments might make 
decisions based on what has or has not happened and anticipate a similar trend in the 
133 Ibid., 204 
134  Robert Shiller, “From Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance,” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 17, no. 1 (Winter 2003): 83–104.  
135  Taleb, The Black Swan, 116.  
136  U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Mutual Funds, Past Performance,” 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/mperf.htm.  
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future. Lacking a significant homeland security event, hindsight and outcome bias can 
lead to complacency. This prevents imagination and the necessary evolution of the 
homeland security system to meet future threats. Past performance does not indicate 
future returns, both in a financial sense and a homeland security sense. 
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IV. DISCUSSION 
A. ANTIFRAGILITY – THE UPSIDE TO RISK 
Warren Buffet’s famous adage helps dictate his approach to risk and buying 
stocks, “Be fearful when others are greedy, and be greedy when others are fearful…bad 
news is an investor’s best friend. It lets you buy a slice of America’s future at a marked-
down price.”137 In financial terms, this is the epitome of buying low and selling high. 
Buffet’s advice, penned a mere six months before the market hit bottom during the 2008 
financial crisis, helped explain why he was actively buying stocks and acquiring 
companies worth tens of billions of dollars. From October 16, 2008, the day his article 
was published, to May 13, 2013, the S&P 500 index gained 108%. Buffet’s advice 
suggests an alternate view to risk; the upside to risk by capitalizing on negative events. 
However, this approach to risk seems contrary to how many interpret risk and 
uncertainty. 
What does Buffett’s advice mean for homeland security? Bubbles and crashes in 
financial markets are also observed in homeland security. The events of 9/11, Hurricane 
Katrina, Super Storm Sandy, the Boston bombings, the near misses of Northwest Flight 
253, and the bombing attempt on Times Square are examples of varying levels of 
volatility. Events such as these can shock the homeland security market. What is 
important is how homeland security investors plan to respond to these events and seek 
long-term opportunity in the midst of crisis. 
 Recalling Slovic’s risk as feelings lends an understanding of why it is so hard for 
people to buy low and sell high. Feelings, through the affect heuristic, heavily influence 
one’s risk perceptions, which in turn can influence one’s decisions and judgments.138 
This suggests that when considering indivdual’s feelings and biases, one often views and 
understands risk as something to be avoided and mitigated.  
137  Warren Buffett, “Buy American. I Am,” New York Times, Oct 16, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/17/opinion/17buffett.html?_r=0.  
138  Slovic et al., “Risk as Feelings,” 311–322.  
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However, this perception can prevent people from planning to benefit from the 
volatility and potential upside that is inherent in risk and uncertainty. Often, the potential 
for greatest opportunities emerge during times when fear and risk seem to dominate the 
conscience, as seen during the nadir of the recent financial crisis in 2009. This suggests 
avoiding risk and volatility, and not preparing for them can actually be harmful. 
However, this does not mean that we should be looking forward to the next financial 
crisis, hurricane, or terrorist event. These inevitably will come. Benefiting from volatility 
means being able to plan to benefit from the crisis. It means never letting a serious crisis 
go to waste.  
Nevertheless, accepting risk, volatility, and uncertainty can be difficult, especially 
in political contexts or when one has been conditioned to rely on the fragile systems all 
around. Rather than shunning risk, how can one leverage the knowledge of biases to 
benefit from risk exposure and volatility? This suggests the need for a strategy that 
accounts for biases and seeks benefits from volatility and risk exposure. 
Taleb describes a unique way of thinking to benefit from Black Swans. He argues 
that Black Swans arise from fragile systems; those that can break when subject to stress 
and volatility. Whether the system concerns, health, finance or politics, critical elements 
make the system fragile. Taleb argues that to counter the fragile systems of this world we 
must seek to build and foster systems that are antifragile. These systems benefit from 
volatility by having more to gain than lose over the long term when subject to stress.139  
More than being robust or resilient, which resist or absorb volatility and return to 
their normal states, things that are antifragile benefit from volatility. They have more 
upside than downside and adapt to become better than they were. Antifragile things are 
inherently asynchronously positive when subject to volatility or stress. Antifragility is a 
strategy for strategies.140  
139 Nassim Taleb, Antifragile, 301–335. 
140  Ibid. 
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But how do we build antifragile systems?  Across the homeland security and 
financial realms, three key elements stand out which can enable the implementation of an 
antifragile system: via negativa, optionality, and leveraging bias knowledge.  
1. Via Negativa 
According to Taleb, via negativa or the negative way, consists of removing the 
fragile elements of our current systems. “We know a lot more about what is wrong than 
what is right…negative knowledge (what is wrong, what does not work right) is more 
robust to error than positive knowledge (what is right, what works).”141  Taleb uses 
happiness as an example that is best dealt with as a negative concept. Avoiding 
unhappiness is a vastly different concept than pursuing happiness and it is a far easier 
concept to grasp.  “Each of us certainly knows not only what makes us unhappy but what 
to do about it,” describes Taleb.142  In a similar fashion, “it is far easier to figure out if 
something is fragile than to predict the occurrence of an event that may harm it;” this is 
Taleb’s solution to the Black Swan problem.143  
Via negativa suggests that individuals and organizations should invest more time 
in identifying those things and processes that do not work correctly, rather than focusing 
on improving or protecting what works. Via negativa is immune to the sway of 
predictions and forecasts; it focuses on removing those elements which create fragility in 
things and require ever more complexity to work. In finance, John Bogle, founder of 
Vanguard and inventor of the index fund, is famous for decrying the erosion impact that 
investment expenses can have on financial investment returns. Bogle argues that people 
fail to account for the “tyranny of compounding costs,” in which Wall Street gets as 
much as 80 percent of returns.144 Expense ratios, transaction costs, and advisor fees are 
some of the most common investment costs that can quickly add up.  
141  Taleb, Antifragile: Things that Gain from Disorder, Kindle edition, 5362.  
142 Ibid., 6410. 
143 Ibid., 354. 
144  John Bogle, “ Frontline Interview,” Feb 7, 2006, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/retirement/interviews/bogle.html#2. 
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In the homeland security realm, the tyranny of compounding costs is also 
relevant. Mueller and Stewart note that DHS has spent well over one trillion dollars in the 
decade following 9/11; costs that they argue are not commensurate with the risks. They 
note that to justify DHS, the common question has been, “Are we safer?” Yet, this seems 
to be a substitute question for the much harder one, “Are the gains in security worth the 
costs?”145 However, the price for safety and security extends beyond purely monetary 
means.   
Admiral William Crowe noted that, “The real danger lies not with what the 
terrorists can do to us, but what we can do to ourselves when we are spooked.”146 
Echoing this sentiment, author William Arkin advocates the view that the national 
security establishment that defends us from terror is actually undermining the liberties 
that make the very essence of this country. He argues that the threat of terrorism has 
generated an “elevation of common defense above public welfare.”147 This suggests that 
the monetary costs and eroded liberties dominate the homeland security portfolio and is 
past due for adjusting and rebalancing. Instead, a via negativa approach would align 
investment activities and costs with expected returns. 
To visualize via negativa for homeland security and finance, consider a tree that is 
antifragile because of regular pruning (see Figure 5). Though pruning subjects the tree to 
stress and volatility, it shapes the future growth of the tree, enabling it to be healthier and 
stronger. Trimming removes those things that negatively impact the growth and vitality, 
e.g., dead branches, sappers, etc. Pruning prepares the tree to withstand the storms and 
droughts of tomorrow. Much like a tree, healthy financial portfolios should be “pruned” 
or rebalanced at least yearly. This includes selling winning stocks while buying oversold 
or distressed stocks. Rebalancing allows an investor to take the time to consider their 
personal situation, investing costs and goals, and the current state of the market.  
145 Mueller, John and Mark Stewart, “Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of Homeland 
Security,” Homeland Security Affairs 7 (August, 2011): 1. 
146  Stephen Flynn, The Edge of Disaster: Rebuilding a Resilient Nation (New York: Random House, 
Feb, 2007), 92–93, Kindle edition. 
147  William Arkin, American Coup: How A Terrified Government is Destroying the Constitution 
(New York: Little Brown and Company, Sept 2013), 4.  
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Figure 5.  A homeland security tree. Trees grow antifragile through regular 
trimming and pruning. Homeland security or a financial portfolio, 
considered as a tree, also grows antifragile through regular trimming and 
rebalancing. Word cloud illustration of www.dhs.gov, created at 
Tagxedo.com. 
Likewise, a homeland security tree might also grow stronger, healthier and more 
antifragile when subject to the volatility and stress of regular pruning and trimming. This 
means that Congress and DHS should evaluate oversight and accountability, and 
continuously assess security activities, adjusting or eliminating activities whose costs are 
incommensurate with the expected gains. A clear example of via negativa is reform of 
DHS Congressional oversight.  
Despite recommendations by the 9/11 Commission for oversight reform, DHS 
currently reports to over 100 committees and subcommittees in Congress. This fractured 
system of oversight makes it difficult to craft substantive legislation that establishes 
homeland security priorities and guides DHS and other stakeholders. A recent bipartisan 
taskforce report on oversight highlights how the current complicated oversight is wasteful 
and negatively impacts how DHS can respond to major vulnerabilities and threats. 
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Consistent with the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation, this task force calls for 
Congressional oversight consisting of one committee in the House and one in the 
Senate.148 Former Governor Thomas Kean and former Representative Lee Hamilton, 
both co-chairmen of the 9/11 Commission and members of the taskforce, argue that “the 
American people will be safer if Congress takes a clearer, less complicated approach to 
its supervision of national security.”149  
Other examples of pruning or via negativa in homeland security include 
combining or eliminating redundant agency activities, such as those of the Coast Guard 
and Customs and Border Protection’s Office of Air and Marine. To address costs, DHS 
could mandate more cost-share policies that allocate security costs to those users who 
benefit the most, i.e, the 9/11 security fee charged to airplane passengers and prioritizing 
and reducing the cost-share of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
disaster assistance.  
To protect against a bubble or an irrational market, DHS should regularly 
question the market and the experts by making bets against market sentiment and 
routinely revisit the level and understanding of risk and challenge assumptions. However, 
mission creep can make this a difficult undertaking. Clay Shirky famously noted that 
sometimes, “Institutions will try to preserve the problem to which they are the 
solution.”150 Known as The Shirky Principle, this relates to the idea that organizations 
can become so obsessed with a strategy that they end up becoming part of the problem 
that they are trying to solve. Just as Wall Street makes its living by perpetuating the idea 
that you must invest your money with the pros to make a return on your investments; 
DHS may be perpetuating the terrorism problem by over-selling the threat of terrorism to 
begin with. Citing Ian Lustick, Muller and Stewart echo this point, noting that the 
148 Annenberg Foundation Trust at Sunnylands and Aspen Institute Justice & Society Program, “Task 
Force Report on Streamlining and Consolidating Congressional Oversight of the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security,” Sep 2013, http://sunnylands.org/files/posts/451/sunnylands.pdf. 
149 Thomas Keane and Lee Hamilton, “Homeland Confusion,” New York Times, Sep 12, 2013. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/11/opinion/homeland-confusion.html. 
150  Barry Popik, “Speech Given by Clay Shirky at South by Southwest Conference,” March 2010, 
http://www.barrypopik.com/.  
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government “can never make enough progress toward ‘protecting America’ to reassure 
Americans against the fears it is helping to stoke.”151  
Unless the terrorism problem continues unabated for decades to come, at some 
point DHS may likely have to redefine itself and what homeland security means to the 
public. As homeland security is ultimately about “effectively managing risks to the 
Nation’s security,” DHS may define its existence by how well it can continue to generate 
fear from potential risks, regardless of the potential costs.152 As evidence points to costs 
being disproportionate with the risks, this suggests that we should look to ways to reduce 
the cost of investing with DHS or seek a new investment manager all together. This via 
negativa approach may require outside innovation and realignment, bearing tough 
questions, such as: Is DHS necessary? What does DHS look like without terrorism? 
Without terrorism—what justifies the Department and its costs to the freedoms of the 
very citizens it has been formed to protect? What costs are we willing to bear for a small 
reduction in risk that is already low? These and similar questions should seek to identify 
and ultimately remove elements of DHS which tend to fragilize things and create the 
need for ever more complexity to function.  
2. Optionality 
In a financial sense, options are a contract sold by one party to another, where the 
buyer has the right, but not the obligation to buy or sell a security at an agreed upon price 
within a certain period of time.153 Options are a means that allow investors to 
asymmetrically deal with uncertainty by limiting downside losses and capitalizing on 
gains. They can be speculative in nature or can act as insurance by transferring risk from 
one party to a counterparty. Options also enable antifragility through seeking opportunity 
in volatility. Thinking in terms of optionality lends us insight in how to benefit from risk, 
volatility, and uncertainty.  
151  Mueller and Stewart, “Costs of Homeland Security,” 16.  
152  Department of Homeland Security, Risk Management Fundamentals, 7–8.  
153  Investopedia Online, s.v. “option,” accessed 24 Nov 2013, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/option.asp.  
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The origin of the option goes back thousands of years. First reported by Aristotle 
in his Politics, he describes the successful trading by a Greek philosopher named Thales 
in approximately 600 BC. Though it was still winter, Thales, using his skills in astrology, 
came to believe that there would be a bountiful harvest of olives in the coming summer. 
More olives would require more olive oil presses. Thales purchased the right or option to 
use all oil presses in two cities at a predetermined price. As Aristotle describes, Thales 
gave some earnest money for “all the oil works that were in Miletus and Chios, which he 
hired at a low price…When the season came for making oil, many persons wanting them, 
he all at once let them upon what terms he pleased.”154 
In this case, the price of olives did increase and Thales rented the olive presses on 
financial terms of his choosing. He limited his downside loss (cost of the option contract) 
while becoming exposed to the potential of much larger gains (upside). By risking his 
earnest money (the price of the option contract) for the potential gain of higher rent prices 
for oil presses, Thales was making an asymmetric bet on the value of olives. This 
“asymmetric bet on prices,” Shiller notes, “is the essence of an option.”155 
Using stocks as an example, investors sometimes hedge against the uncertainty of 
a sudden fall in stock price by buying the option to sell a stock (buying a “put”) at a 
predetermined price within a defined period of time. Options can also be used to 
speculate or bet on the direction of a stock’s price.156 Like Thales, if you believe the 
stock is going up over a certain period of time, you might buy a call option, giving you 
the right to buy a stock at a predetermined price. When the stock exceeds this price, the 
option is profitable. 
Outside of finance, thinking in terms of options enables acceptance of uncertainty 
and volatility, and aids in the ability to spot opportunities. “An option,” according to 
154  Aristotle, Politics: A Treatise on Government, trans. William Ellis, Kindle edition (New York: 
E.P. Dutton & Co., 2013), 528–531.  
155  Shiller, Finance and the Good Society, 1990–91.  
156 The price of an option contract is a derivative of the price of the underlying stock, the agreed 
execution price (strike price), and time (the length of the contract option). Just as with other markets with 
buyers and sellers, option writers and option buyers reflect different views on the performance outlook of a 
particular stock; one party is betting or hedging on a fall in the stock price, while the other is seeking a rise 
in price. 
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Taleb, “is what makes you antifragile and allows you to benefit from the positive side of 
uncertainty, without a corresponding serious harm from the negative side.”157 
Optionality, or thinking in terms of options, allows us to view risk as something that is 
necessary.  
However, when we fail to see the benefits of optionality, opportunities arising 
from risk, volatility, and uncertainty can often be lost. In the homeland security realm, the 
federal government has been using options as a means of risk transfer and insuring state 
and local governments against natural disasters. However, the government has been 
doing so at an unsustainable market discount. FEMA, through the Robert T. Stafford 
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, has been selling options in disaster aid 
and assistance to the states at an unusually high market discount. Under this Act, the 
federal government can contribute up to 75% of a declared disaster.158 However, in 
subsequent appropriations this amount is often exceeded, up to 90%.159   
Highlighting the reliance on FEMA, the average number of disaster declarations 
by Presidential Administrations has steadily increased from 28 under President Reagan to 
141 under President Obama.160 When it comes to disaster recovery, states are looking 
first to the federal government. This excessive homogeneity concerning disaster recovery 
has a negative impact on local disaster preparedness. Reminiscent of Hardin’s Tragedy of 
the Commons, states are buying disaster recovery options at massive discounts from the 
federal government. These options act as massive subsidies for disaster and recovery 
insurance that disincentivize attempts to build long-term preventative measures. This also 
limits the options available for the federal government to respond to larger scale disasters. 
Recall that Hardin’s approach to this problem was not to harden or grow the commons 
157  Taleb, Antifragile, Kindle edition 3111–3113.  
158  Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5170 (2010).  
159  Disaster Assistance, 44 C.F.R. § 206.47 (2010).  
160 Heritage Foundation, “FEMA Declarations by Year and Presidential Administrations,” Oct 31, 
2012, http://www.heritage.org/multimedia/infographic/2012/10/fema-declarations-by-year-and-by-
presidential-administration; Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Disaster Declarations,” 
http://www.fema.gov/disasters. 
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but to not maintain it.161 Rather than continue to keep options limited by reinforcing the 
commons, FEMA reform advocates argue that Congress should reduce FEMA’s cost-
share provision for all disaster declarations to no more than 25%. This would ensure 
FEMA is better prepared and equipped to handle large scale national level disasters while 
reducing the systemic reliance of states on federal disaster assistance funding.162 
Timothy Luehrman argues for using options as a means to craft and execute 
strategy. He discusses how options in strategic thinking “incorporate both the uncertainty 
inherent in business and the active decision making required for strategy to succeed.”163 
He uses gardening as a metaphor for cultivating a portfolio of options in a strategy to 
yield the most bountiful harvest. Here the strategist is the gardener and must price the 
risks of decisions taken now versus the potential of deferred gains in the future. 
Everything in between is presented as options, which the gardener must appropriately 
price and incorporate into their strategy. Just as master gardeners have years of 
experience, success in this endeavor often takes time.  
“How does one become a good gardener? Practice. Practice,” states Luehrman.164 
This is a simple yet important point. Through practice or trial and error, optionality is 
cultivated, discovering and exploiting new options that can yield outsized benefits with 
minimal downside. Supporting this point, Taleb argues that “any trial and error can be 
seen as the expression of an option, so long as one is capable of identifying a favorable 
result and exploiting it.”165 
However, trial and error, and thus cultivating optionality, is often limited because 
of an innate fear of failure. Rita McGrath highlights the importance of using an options 
paradigm for discovering opportunities at the risk of failure, especially as it applies for 
161  Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 1243–1248.  
162 Heritage Foundation, “FEMA Reform and Disaster Response: Heritage Foundation 
Recommendations,” Sep 8, 2011, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/09/fema-reform-and-
disaster-response-heritage-foundation-recommendations. 
163  Timothy A. Luehrman, “Strategy as a Portfolio of Real Options,” Harvard Business Review 76, 
no. 5 (Sep 1998): 89.  
164 Ibid., 99. 
165  Taleb, Antifragile, Kindle edition 3277–3278.  
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entrepreneurship. While entrepreneurship, through trial and error, can unleash “gales of 
creative destruction,” embracing it also implies accepting the uncertainties, volatility, and 
risk, which are often manifest in failure. “Enthusiasm for risk taking in the 
entrepreneurial process wanes considerably at the prospect of failure,” notes McGrath.166   
Unlike in finance, in reality the best options are those that sometimes do not cost 
anything; one simply has to have the commonsense to exploit a favorable option when it 
presents itself. While options in finance are specifically identified and can be expensive 
to purchase, options in other domains can be quite inexpensive. Fear of failure and 
uncertainty can often times inhibit us from exploiting favorable options when we see 
them; in other cases we simply are not open to ideas of potentially new opportunities 
outside of our familiarity. “Because of the domain dependence of our minds, we do not 
recognize [options] in other places, where these options tend to remain underpriced or not 
priced at all,” declares Taleb.167  
Options are a means that allow investors to asymmetrically deal with uncertainty 
by limiting downside losses and capitalizing on gains. Options also enable antifragility 
through seeking opportunity in volatility, uncertainty, and risk. However, these same 
elements also connote prospects of failure, and the fear of failure is a roadblock to 
discovering and exploiting options. When it comes to the fear of failure, our human 
biases certainly play a part. Understanding the role that our biases have on how we make 
decisions subject to uncertainty and risk may help to dispel or limit our fear of failure. 
3. Leveraging Bias Knowledge 
Antifragility thrives in the presence of volatility. One means to promote 
acceptance of volatility in a dynamic system would be to leverage the knowledge of how 
our biases impact our risk perception and judgments.  
Our loss aversion bias noted by Kahneman’s and Tversky’s prospect theory, 
suggests that we are more upset by losses than we are by equivalent gains and will go 
166  Rita McGrath, “Falling Forward: Real Options Reasoning and Entrepreneurial Failure,” Academy 
of Management Review 24, no. 1 (Jan 1999): 13.  
167  Taleb, Antifragile, Kindle edition 3295–3298.  
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through great risk, often to our own detriment, for the possibility of avoiding any losses 
at all.168 This indicates that when we recognize losses we are really recognizing our own 
failures, which we can often be loath to do. In finance, Shiller describes how these 
tendencies can be seen by investor’s unwillingness to admit their failed investment 
strategies through their reluctance to sell losing stocks.169 Understanding how the 
dynamics of loss-aversion, especially in the context of uncertainty, suggests that we 
should instead think in terms of options. This means viewing potential losses as costs 
ahead of time, thus mitigating the fear of failure. This should enable more careful 
consideration of what costs we are willing to bear ahead of time, while taking advantage 
of the potential for outsized returns over the long run. 
We should also remain aware of the deleterious impacts of other biases, such as 
confidence bias, cognitive dissonance, and groupthink, which tend to erode our ability to 
recognize losses and enable our fear of failure. Additionally, affect heuristics influenced 
by availability, probability neglect, and our own reference points and hindsight guide our 
perceptions of risk.170 Failure to recognize the influence that these biases have on our 
risk perceptions and decisions reduces optionality and the ability to asymmetrically deal 
with uncertainty. Recognition of how our biases can both harm and benefit us is key to 
developing an antifragile strategy that can thrive in the presence of risk and uncertainty. 
In a financial sense, this implies optionality through multiple parallel paths. These 
include diversifying portfolios and using consistent broad framed strategies, such as 
dollar cost averaging, establishing automatic savings vehicles and maintaining a 
sufficient capital reserve to take advantage of market corrections. Opportunity costs are 
realized when portfolios earn less than the average aggregate market return during upside 
cyclical or bull markets. However, when markets turn negative, losses are minimized 
while cultivating options (optionality) to employ excess capital reserves to buy during 
market corrections. For investing, this broad framed approach seeks to remove the 
168  Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, 282–308.   
169  Shiller, “Efficient Markets to Behavioral Finance,” 83–104.  
170  Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, 278–340.  
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negative impacts (via negativa) that our biases can have on investment returns by 
establishing a methodological approach to investing. 
In the homeland security and national security realm, the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is a leading example of a government agency that is 
antifragile. DARPA’s success comes from its use of eliminating fear of failure by 
incorporating failure into the organization enterprise (via negativa), establishing multiple 
parallel paths for projects with defined goals (i.e., cultivating optionality) and leveraging 
bias knowledge to work to DARPA’s advantage. Originally created in 1958 in response 
to the shock of the Soviet Union’s launch of the world’s first satellite, Sputnik, the nation 
established DARPA with the mission of “preventing technological surprise from 
adversely affecting our country while creating surprises for U.S. adversaries.”171 While 
famously noted for revolutionary inventions and projects such as the Internet, GPS, and 
stealth technology, 85–90% of DARPA projects fail.172 Despite this inordinate failure 
rate, the impacts of DARPA’s successes have been outsized, vastly paying for its budget 
many times over. This represents DARPA’s antifragility; having more to gain than lose 
over the long term (i.e., asynchronous positive affects). 
DARPA is a risk-seeking agency and is not constrained by risky projects that 
ultimately fail. Being antifragile, risk and volatility are necessary components to prevent 
and create technological surprise and deliver outsized successes. By challenging the 
status quo and thinking outside of and beyond the prevailing perspectives, DARPA 
creates a culture not constrained by failure.  
DARPA’s noteworthy successes and failures stem from developing a culture that 
removes the fear of failure, no matter how remote the chances of success or how risky the 
project. “When you remove the fear of failure, impossible things suddenly become 
171  Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, “DARPA Framework 2013- Driving Technological 
Surprise: DARPA’s Mission in a Changing World,” Apr 2013, 
http://www.darpa.mil/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx@id=2147486475.pdf.  
172  Charles Piller, “Army of Extreme Thinkers,” Los Angeles Times, August 14, 2003, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2003/aug/14/science/sci-darpa14. 
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possible,” noted former DARPA director Regina Dugan. “I’m not encouraging failure. 
I’m discouraging fear of failure.”173   
Prospect theory is relevant to DARPA’s culture, where imagination and vividness 
of memory can make “the actual probability of success inconsequential; only possibility 
matters.”174 In DARPA’s case, it is the possibility that matters. Leveraging and fostering 
possibility through human imagination and creativity, DARPA is in effect trying to force 
the discovery and creation of positive and negative Black Swans, what they call off-scale 
impact. As noted by Kahneman, emotional framing of loss aversion suggests that the 
public sees DARPA’s failures as costs rather than losses. This enables a culture at 
DARPA which is in fact risk seeking and allows public acceptance of the costs of a 90% 
failure rate in return for the richly oversized 10% successes.   
Enabling outsized successes in the face of recurring failure is DARPA’s culture. 
As DARPA itself notes in its 2013 Framework report, “The most important ingredient in 
keeping DARPA healthy and robust [is] our culture. The relentless drive for off-scale 
impact. The willingness to take risk in pursuit of that impact,” remains the quintessence 
of their continued success.175 Additionally, because of these outsized successes and off-
scale impact, hindsight bias suggests that DARPA will continue to have similar success 
in the future. In fact this hindsight bias creates a prestige, which continues to draw some 
of the most creative, and “brilliant minds to court failure for a chance at greatness.”176  
 
 
173  Regina Duncan, “Regina Duncan - from Mach 20 Glider to Hummingbird Drone,” Filmed Mar 
2012, TED video, 25:02, Posted Mar 2012, 
http://www.ted.com/talks/regina_dugan_from_mach_20_glider_to_humming_bird_drone.html.  
174  Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, 323.  
175 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, “DARPA Framework 2013,” 16. 
176 Piller, “Army of Extreme Thinkers.”  
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
“Humpty Dumpty sat on a wall: Humpty Dumpty had a great fall. 
All the Department’s horses and all the Department’s men, 
Couldn’t put Humpty Dumpty back together again.”177 
 
This thesis begins by eavesdropping on the conversation between Alice and 
Humpty Dumpty. As a metaphor, it can be instructive to consider their conversation 
concerning the meaning of homeland security, perhaps in a Wonderland setting (see 
Figure 6): 
 
“Don’t you think you’d be safer on the ground? That wall is so very 
narrow!” exclaimed Alice. 
 
“What tremendously easy riddles you ask!” Humpty Dumpty growled. “Of 
course I don’t think so! Why, if ever I did fall off— which there’s no 
chance of—but if I did...if I did fall,” he went on, “The Department of 
Homeland Security has promised me __ to __ to __” 
 
“To send all of his horses and all of his men,” Alice interrupted. “But tell 
me,” asked Alice, “what do you mean by homeland security? What or who 
is homeland security?” 
 
“When I say homeland security,” Humpty Dumpty said in a rather 
scornful voice, “it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor 
less!”  
 
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make homeland security 
mean so many different things.”  
 




177 Changes to the original rhyme are mine. 
178  Changes to original dialogue of Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass (page 980) are mine.  
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Figure 6.  Humpty Dumpty in the midst of a discussion with Alice on the 
meaning of homeland security (adapted from illustration by John Tenniel 
from Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass.) 
As Humpty Dumpty alludes, homeland security can mean different things to 
different people. However, varying definitions of homeland security can cause 
misalignment with budgets and homeland security strategies.179 While the definition of 
homeland security continues to evolve, this thesis sets out to understand homeland 
security through the lens of risk and uncertainty. It looks across domains to financial 
markets to explore how humans interact and make decisions when surrounded by risk 
that is dynamic.  
The usefulness of the financial market metaphor is that it allows one to 
conceptualize homeland security as an investor’s financial portfolio that is subject to 
market volatility, market sentiment and mood, investing costs, and market bubbles and 
busts. What this teaches us is that the financial and homeland security domains share the 
common denominator of individual and market behavior that is profoundly affected by 
psychological biases, especially when confronted by complex risk and uncertainty. 
Recognizing the impact that these biases have in shaping judgments, behaviors, 
and risk perceptions allows one to better understand homeland security. This results in 
identifying antifragility as a nontraditional risk management strategy for the homeland 
security domain that is less dependent on definitions. Antifragility is a strategy that can 
help leverage knowledge of biases and craft a portfolio that takes advantage of risk, 




                                                 
uncertainty, and volatility. Using financial markets as a metaphor helps to envision how 
antifragility applies to an investor’s portfolio and by extension, what it means to be 
antifragile in homeland security.  
Studying the financial domain requires understanding how investors allocate 
limited assets over time under conditions of certainty and uncertainty. To study the 
homeland security domain is to consider how individuals allocate limited resources on a 
rational or seemingly irrational prioritized risk basis to prevent or mitigate terrorist 
attacks within the United States. This requires reducing the vulnerability of the strategic 
components of American power, which includes the economy and its financial 
domain.180 Financial markets have huge implications for the solvency of the nation and 
the general condition of the economy. Protecting the security and confidence of others in 
the nation’s economy and financial systems is one of the key objectives of the homeland 
security domain.181  
To understand homeland security as a stock market, it is important to understand 
how stock markets behave. In many instances, stock markets behave efficiently. In an 
efficient market, stock prices revolve around the continuous flow and interpretation of 
information/data where stock prices fully reflect all available information. Transactions 
in the market, seen as buying and selling, serve as a means of price discovery, where 
investors learn the value of whatever is being traded.182 As new information becomes 
available, the market quickly digests and adjusts prices accordingly.  
Similarly, an efficient homeland security market implies that transactions between 
adversaries also serve as a means of price discovery. Advantages and exploitations from 
180 James  Kurth cites economic power as the essential base for military and ideological power. See 
“Pillars of the American Century,” http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=688; ADM 
Michael Mullen has in multiple venues cited the national debt as the most significant threat to national 
security. See http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/08/27/debt.security.mullen/. 
181 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano’s 2nd 
Annual Address on the State of America’s Homeland Security: Homeland Security and Economic 
Security,” Department of Homeland Security, Jan 30, 2012. 
http://www.dhs.gov/news/2012/01/30/secretary-homeland-security-janet-napolitanos-2nd-annual-address-
state-americas. 
182  Robert Shiller, Finance and the Good Society, Kindle edition (New York: Princeton University 
Press, 2012), 555.  
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either an adversary perspective (i.e., threats), or from a government perspective (i.e., 
countermeasures) are short lived, as each entity acts on the available information in the 
environment. Intelligence is analyzed to determine the potential threats, vulnerabilities, 
and consequences. Countermeasures are employed to areas of greatest risk, while the 
political process engages regulations and international regimes to mitigate risk. As 
information is discovered in the homeland security market, the price or value of the 
exchange between threats and countermeasures increases or decreases. 
Alternatively, research from psychology and behavioral economics have shed new 
light on the nonefficient nature of financial markets. Biases, irrational behaviors, and 
feedback of the market participants themselves affect and are affected by valuation and 
the perception of risks. This helps to explain why many investors buy high and sell low, 
and why markets undergo bubbles and busts. Market complexity gives an idea of the 
inherent nature of things to move from a state of stability to instability, or from an 
efficient market to an inefficient one. This is the study of individual yet interconnected 
parts of a system that tend to move from a state of equilibrium to upheaval, as seen 
through bubbles, busts, and Black Swans.183 
In a similar fashion, bubbles and inefficient markets can also be seen from a 
homeland security system perspective. Nowhere is this more apparent than with 
terrorism. Inadequate and inappropriate countermeasures can occur for numerous 
reasons, including but not limited to complacency, fiscal reductions, and not 
understanding or underestimating the dynamic and agile nature of threats. Similar to an 
investment portfolio that is not diversified, not having the necessary countermeasures in 
place increases risk in the homeland security system and can lead to a vacuum bubble of 
under-protection.   
Yet perhaps even more common in a post-9/11 environment, though sometimes 
inconspicuous, is a bubble of over-protection. This can entail massive use of costly 
resources and restrictive regulations that can limit individual freedoms in exchange for a 
183  Mark Buchanan, Ubiquity: Why Catastrophes Happen (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2001), 
273; Ted Lewis, Bak’s Sand Pile (Williams California: Agile Press, 2011), 46; Melanie Mitchell, 
Complexity A Guided Tour, Kindle edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 335.  
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promise of safety. Likewise, public outrage from terrorism and its political dimensions 
can demand homeland security leadership to react and employ numerous and often-costly 
antiterrorism activities, even if these actions cannot be proven effective.  
This thesis cautions that in the current market, homeland security can easily fall 
victim to or may already be operating in a bubble of over-protection without sufficient 
regard to the cost-benefits. In financial markets, investment expenses and opportunity 
costs from an overly conservative portfolio can have debilitating affects on returns. Akin 
to an overly conservative portfolio, homeland security may be operating in a bubble of 
over-protection, where the monetary and personal liberty costs can be incommensurate 
with the expected end-states of safety and security. 
Biases also play a major role in interfering with our ability to interpret and 
understand our actual exposure and susceptibility to market volatility and Black Swan 
events.184 The events of 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, Super Storm Sandy, the Boston 
bombings, the near misses of Northwest Flight 253, and the bombing attempt on Times 
Square all represent varying levels of volatility. Events such as these can shock the 
homeland security market. These events show that even with sound investing strategies, a 
homeland security portfolio is still subject to the volatilities and uncertainty of the 
market. However, as Warren Buffett asserts, often the potential for greatest opportunities 
emerge during times when fear and risk seem to dominate the conscience, as seen during 
the nadir of the recent financial crisis in 2009. What is important is how homeland 
security investors plan to respond to these events and seek long-term opportunity in the 
midst of crisis.  
Adopting a broad framed, antifragile strategy is key to dealing with and taking 
advantage of Black Swans, volatility, and uncertainty. More than being robust or 
resilient, which resist or absorb volatility and return to their normal states, strategies that 
are antifragile benefit from volatility, have more upside than downside, adapt and become 
184  D. Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), 278–288. 
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better than they were. An antifragile strategy incorporates via negativa, optionality, and 
leveraging knowledge of biases.185  
To make something antifragile, individuals and organizations should invest more 
time in identifying those things and processes that are negative rather than focus on the 
positive. This is known as via negativa, or the negative way. What is known to be 
harmful is more robust to errors than what we know is good. Removing things that are 
negative can uncover hidden options that can better prepare people or organizations for 
uncertainty and market volatility. Options are a means that allow investors to 
asymmetrically deal with uncertainty by limiting downside losses and capitalizing on 
gains. Options also enable antifragility through seeking opportunity in volatility that is 
inherent in both the homeland and financial markets.186  
A clear example of antifragility through via negativa is reform of Congressional 
oversight of DHS. Despite recommendations by the 9/11 Commission, DHS currently 
reports to over 100 committees and subcommittees in Congress. This fractured system of 
oversight makes it difficult to craft substantive legislation that establishes homeland 
security priorities and guides DHS and other stakeholders. A recent bipartisan taskforce 
report on oversight highlights how the current complicated oversight is wasteful and 
negatively impacts how DHS can respond to major vulnerabilities and threats. Consistent 
with the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation, this task force calls for Congressional 
oversight consisting of one committee in the House and one in the Senate.187 Former 
Governor Thomas Kean and former Representative Lee Hamilton, both co-chairmen of 
the 9/11 Commission and members of the taskforce, argue that “the American people will 
be safer if Congress takes a clearer, less complicated approach to its supervision of 
national security.”188 Oversight reform should allow more transparency and direction for 
185 Nassim Taleb, Antifragile, 301–335. 
186 Ibid. 
187 Annenberg Foundation Trust at Sunnylands and Aspen Institute Justice & Society Program, “Task 
Force Report on Streamlining and Consolidating Congressional Oversight of the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security,” Sep 2013, http://sunnylands.org/files/posts/451/sunnylands.pdf. 
188 Thomas Keane and Lee Hamilton, “Homeland Confusion,” New York Times, Sep 12, 2013. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/11/opinion/homeland-confusion.html. 
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how to allocate and appropriate scarce homeland security funding. Currently, 
approximately 50% of homeland security funding appropriations is not spent on DHS 
activities and missions.189 Oversight reform should enable more options and 
prioritization of this funding to ensure that costs are being appropriately applied towards 
risks. 
Other examples of antifragility through via negativity might mean adjusting or 
eliminating activities whose costs are disproportionate to the expected gains, including 
combining or eliminating redundant agency activities, i.e., Coast Guard and Customs and 
Border Protection maritime security activities. To address costs, DHS should mandate 
more cost-share policies that allocate security costs to those users who benefit the most, 
i.e, the 9/11 aviation security fee and FEMA disaster assistance. Table 1. illustrates how 
these and other examples of antifragility might be applied in homeland security. 
189 Shawn Reese, Defining Homeland Security, 7. 
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Table 1.   How antifragility might be applied in homeland security 
In an era of sequester and diminishing budgets, pruning is imperative. As 
evidence points to costs being disproportionate with the risks, this suggests that Congress 
and the Administration should seek ways to gain broader consensus to reduce the cost of 
investing with DHS or seek a new investment manager all together. For example, this via 
negativa approach may require outside innovation and realignment, bearing tough 
questions, such as: What costs are we willing to bear for a small reduction in risk that is 
already low? These and similar questions should seek to expose and ultimately remove 
 64 
elements of DHS which tend to fragilize things and create a need for ever more 
complexity to function.  
This thesis advances a nontraditional risk management strategy of antifragility for 
homeland security. This relies less on definitions of homeland security by managing the 
security environment bottom up rather than top down - removing the small negative risks 
to reduce the overall systemic risk. Antifragility is not a stock picking methodology. It 
will not suggest what stocks to buy tomorrow or what homeland security 
countermeasures need to be employed. Rather, it is a strategy for strategies; it creates 
options to better prepare for and take advantage of future market volatility. Antifragility 
in homeland security requires one to regularly challenge assumptions by making bets 
against market sentiment and routinely revisit the level and understanding of risk. In their 
particular sphere of influence, homeland security practitioners should ask, “What does 
not work well? What negatively impacts my work in homeland security? How can I have 
an impact to change these things?” The answers to these questions will likely produce a 
homeland security strategy that is more impactful, less reliant on definitions, and more 
robust to error than many activities and strategies employed today. This is what it means 
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